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 Abstract 
 Improving principal quality in Arkansas may be a partial solution to the public policy 
problem of low performing public schools.  Just as policymakers in other states are beginning to 
explore incentive-based compensation policies to improve principal quality, education 
policymakers in Arkansas should look to these policies as a way to align goals and minimize 
agency costs. Setting incentives tied to transparent, publicly available performance measures can 
resolve monitoring difficulties inherent in principal-agent relationships and can improve goal 
congruence by signaling clearly about policy priorities. Before plowing forward with 
performance pay reforms for school principals, Arkansas policymakers could make better 
decisions in light of research about the Arkansas principal labor market. Specifically, 
understanding whether more effective principals earn larger salaries or get higher increases in 
pay can inform policymakers about the incentives that currently exist in the principal labor 
market and can guide their policy reform decisions about how to improve principal quality. 
 The original research in this study indicates that principals in Arkansas are not 
meaningfully rewarded for superior performance, either through explicit performance bonuses or 
though earning higher salaries by being hired in better paying principalships. Variation in 
principal pay is driven by the district and school enrollment, the amount of wealth in a district, a 
principal’s experience, and a principal’s degree level. If policymakers would like to focus 
principal attention on performance, rather than encouraging them simply to earn higher degrees 
or to seek employment in large, wealthy districts, policymakers should consider instituting 
performance-based pay. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction 
 An essential feature of the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act in 2001 – the landmark federal education policy commonly known as No 
Child Left Behind (NCLB) – was the stated focus on teacher quality as a critical 
component for improving public education (Darling-Hammond and Sykes, 2003; U.S 
Department of Education , 2003).  NCLB’s accountability system, focusing on 
standardized testing and the threat of sanctions for poor performance, included a 
requirement that participating states design a policy for ensuring that all students were 
being taught by a Highly Qualified Teacher (HQT) by the end of the 2005-06 school year 
(U.S. Department of Education , 2003).   
 Just as NCLB has focused attention on the importance of providing each student 
with a highly qualified teacher, educational policymakers at the national, state, and local 
levels are now beginning to turn their attention to school principal quality. At a hearing of 
the House Education and Labor Committee in May 2007, witnesses testified before 
Congress that initiatives to improve principal quality should be central to reauthorization 
of NCLB (Office of George Miller, 2007). Education reformers and legislators are 
choosing to focus on improving the quality of human resources because of the mounting 
evidence that good principals can (Marzano et al., 2005; Brewer, 1993; Hallinger and 
Heck, 1998; Nettles and Herrington, 2007) and good teachers (Hanushek and Rivkin, 
2004; Sanders and Rivers, 1996, Darling-Hammond, 2000; Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain, 
2005) do make a difference for student achievement (Office of George Miller, 2007). 
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 Education reforms to address low student achievement can be categorized 
generally into four categories: (a) those which focus on governance reforms, such as 
charter schools, (b) those which seek to drive improvement by creating higher standards 
through standards and testing, (c) those aimed at improving curriculum, and (d) those 
which focus on human capital improvements. A school’s key human resources include 
teachers and principals. Because principals can impact educational outcomes, either 
directly (Marzano et al., 2005) or indirectly (Brewer, 1993; Hallinger and Heck, 1998; 
Nettles and Herrington, 2007), some policymakers believe that improving principal 
quality will lead to better student achievement. To improve student achievement by 
raising principal quality, policymakers consider the policy levers available that can 
impact features of the existing principal labor market.  
 Some local and state policymakers across the nation have already begun to 
experiment voluntarily with new solutions to the problem of low student academic 
performance by focusing their attention on school principal quality (Goldhaber, 2007). 
As examples of this growing trend, I describe below several state initiatives in Texas and 
two local initiatives – New York City school district’s principal evaluation program and 
the Pittsburgh PULSE program. 
According to Lewis and Springer (2008), pay-for-performance plans have been a 
part of the Texas public education landscape since the 1980’s. In the last three years, in 
addition to having nine districts participating in federally funded performance pay 
programs through the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), Texas has implemented three state-
funded incentive pay programs for educators as a part of the Governor’s Educator 
Excellence Award Program (GEEAP) – the Governor’s Educator Excellence Grant 
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(GEEG), the Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG), and District Awards for Teacher 
Excellence (DATE) (U.S. Department of Education, 2008; Terry, 2008; Lewis and 
Springer, 2008). GEEG and TEEG are targeted at high poverty, high performing districts 
(Terry, 2008). The DATE grants, though they provide recipient districts with some 
flexibility, stipulate that districts must use a certain portion for teacher awards tied 
directly to student performance and a certain portion for other incentives, including 
principal incentives (Terry, 2008). Not all of these programs focus primarily on principal 
performance, but many of them provide rewards for principals based on the student 
achievement of their students. 
In the Austin Independent School District, for example, principals can earn up to 
$8,000 in bonuses depending on the magnitude of student growth in reading and math on 
Texas state achievement tests (Terry, 2008). Dallas Independent School District (DISD) 
has been providing pay incentives for principals as a part of the district’s school 
performance awards program since 1992 (Ladd, 1999, Terry, 2008). Although DISD 
stopped using that program in 2007-08, it recently instituted a new performance pay plan 
that includes bonuses of up to $10,000 for principals (Terry, 2008). In addition to 
receiving state funds through GEEG and TEEG (Terry, 2008), this new DISD plan is also 
federally-funded through a TIF grant (U.S. Department of Education, 2008). As 
Goldhaber (2007) and Terry (2008) note, Houston Independent School District (HISD) 
also has a performance pay plan that includes financial rewards for principals. Having 
evolved from the merit pay plans HISD has used over the last decade (Terry, 2008), 
HISD’s current incentive pay plan is funded by TIF money, foundation support, and state 
grants, and district principals can earn up to $12,000 for superior performance (Houston 
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Independent School District, 2007). Local incentive pay programs are also emerging 
across the country as well. 
In January 2008, New York City public schools administration announced 
reforms to improve the selection and evaluation of principals (Gootman, 2008). The new 
selection process would involve centralized screening of applicants. The new evaluation 
system would incorporate a 0-4 rating scale based on detailed criteria, including student 
test scores. With biannual ratings, this new system would replace the existing annual 
rating system of principals that had a satisfactory-unsatisfactory grading scale (Gootman, 
2008). Similarly, Pittsburgh Public Schools have begun to reform training, evaluation, 
and accountability systems of the district’s principals.  
Just as in New York, principals in Pittsburgh have traditionally been rated on a 
satisfactory-unsatisfactory scale and have been compensated primarily based on 
experience. With the initiation of the Pittsburgh Urban Leadership System for Excellence 
(PULSE) program in the 2007-08 school year, principals are now evaluated and 
compensated based on their performance (Pittsburgh Public Schools, 2008). Through the 
program’s pay-for-performance component, principals can earn a $2,000 raise as a part of 
their salary for earning proficient ratings across the evaluation rubric (Pittsburgh Public 
Schools, 2008; Goldhaber, 2007). They can also earn up to $10,000 as a bonus for 
improvements in student achievement, measured in part by performance on standardized 
tests (Pittsburgh Public Schools, 2008; Goldhaber, 2007). 
 As is evident in the state and local principal evaluation and compensation reform 
efforts described above, policymakers are looking at new ways to select, evaluate, and 
compensate principals to assure that students can benefit from the learning communities 
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produced by high quality school leaders. When policymakers attempt to provide 
incentives to motivate behavioral changes by principals and teachers regarding their 
career choices, policymakers are using levers that can change the public education labor 
market.   Unfortunately, policymakers are often operating without a comprehensive 
understanding of the principal labor market. Indeed, as Goldhaber (2007) notes, little 
research on school principal compensation has been performed either at a general 
descriptive level or at a detailed analytical level. It is safe to say that the efforts of 
policymakers to institute incentive-based reforms designed to improve principal quality 
would benefit from a broader understanding of the existing principal labor market. 
 These incentive-pay policy proposals rely on assumptions informed by principal-
agent theory and on research regarding teacher performance pay plans. Before plowing 
forward with performance pay reforms for school principals, Arkansas policymakers 
could perhaps make better decisions in light of research about the Arkansas principal 
labor market. Moreover, the applicability of principal-agent theory to this educational 
context must be analyzed. Additionally, potential differences between the principal and 
teacher labor markets may in fact render such policy solutions unnecessary. Namely, a 
performance pay system for principals may already be in place. In other words, there may 
be variation in principal pay in different school settings statewide, and highly effective 
principals may already be sorting themselves into better paying jobs.  This study is 
intended to inform policymakers about the existing features of the school principal labor 
market in Arkansas and about the merits of policy proposals that include principal 
performance pay.  Further, this study will add to the scholarly literature on incentive-
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based compensation policies to improve student achievement through better educational 
leadership. 
Statement of the Problem 
 
  Improving principal quality in Arkansas may be a partial solution to the public 
policy problem of low performing public schools. Arkansas K-12 student achievement is 
relatively low both in comparison to other states and in absolute terms. Performance data 
in Table 1.1 from the National Assessment of Education Progress, NAEP, reveal that the 
academic achievement of K-12 students in Arkansas lags behind the rest of the nation. 
Arkansas students ranked 31st out of 51 in 2007 on the Grade 4 Math Exam and 36th out 
of 51 on the Grade 4 Reading Exam. On the Grade 8 Math and Reading Exams, Arkansas 
students fared even worse. They ranked 42nd out of 51 on Grade 8 Reading and 40th
 
 on 
Grade 8 Math. 
Table 1.1: Arkansas Performance in Average Scale Scores on 2007 National Assessment 
of Education Progress Compared to Other States (Including DC)  
 
  
Grade 4 
Math 
Grade 4 
Reading 
Grade 8 
Math 
Grade 8 
Reading 
Ranking out of 51 31st 36 42nd th 40th  
Arkansas 238 217 274 258 
National Average 239 220 280 261 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education 
Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 2007 Mathematics Assessment. 
NOTE: The NAEP Mathematics scale ranges from 0 to 500. Observed differences are not necessarily 
statistically significant. 
 
 In absolute terms, this low relative performance ultimately results in an extremely 
high college remediation rate. According to the 2007 Arkansas School Performance 
Report issued annually by the National Office for Research on Measurement and 
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Evaluation Systems at the University of Arkansas, the college remediation rate in 2007 
was 48.1 percent (Arkansas State Report Card, 2007). This figure means that 
approximately 50 percent of students who have taken the ACT would need to take a 
remedial college course in Mathematics, English, or both subjects (Remediation Rate, 
2008).  
Rationale for the Study 
 
This study is designed as a guide Arkansas state policymakers who are 
considering improvements in educational leadership at the school level as strategy for 
raising student achievement in the state. Very little research has been conducted on the 
features of the school principal labor market. At the conclusion of a recent study on 
principal compensation, teacher and principal compensation expert Dan Goldhaber 
(2007) noted: 
… outside of a few high-profile examples, we have virtually no systemic 
knowledge about the structure of principal compensation including the 
extent to which compensation is linked to specific principal credentials or 
characteristics, or covered by collective bargaining agreements; whether 
principals are financially rewarded for taking tough leadership 
assignments; and whether there is a link between their compensation and 
measures of their performance. It should come as no surprise that a 
researcher is recommending more research on a topic, but, in this case, the 
need is profound. (p. 15) 
 
Indeed, there is a dearth of research on the school principal labor market, and 
policymakers in Arkansas would benefit from a comprehensive understanding of the 
characteristics of this sector before proposing substantive changes.  
 For this reason, this study includes a broad exploration of the topic, including 
explanation of the barriers to entry into the profession that are designed to ensure 
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principal quality. For example, I discuss educational and experience prerequisites that 
impact the supply of principals. I also consider current monitoring, or evaluation, 
practices that are intended to reinforce high standards for educational leadership 
performance. Alongside this discussion about policies and practices that influence school 
principal quality, I present descriptive statistics about features of the workforce that has 
resulted from these policies. I also investigate the factors that impact both changes in the 
level of principal pay and the rate of increase in principal pay.  
Before designing policy solutions to ameliorate potential educational inadequacies 
related to leadership, policymakers need a clear understanding of the principal pay and 
quality landscape and the nature of any patterns of principal sorting. For example, 
policymakers should understand if, in fact, low-income or low-performing students are 
routinely served by low quality principals before offering monetary incentives that can 
motivate higher quality principals to choose to work in such settings. Specifically, this 
study will reveal the sorting patterns of principals with varying characteristics and 
whether high-performing principals are already being rewarded for meeting student 
achievement standards. With this information about the incentives inherent in the current 
principal labor market, policymakers can better evaluate policies that propose to modify 
how principals are evaluated and paid. 
Outline of the Study 
  In Chapter One, I establish the relevance of investigating principal quality reform 
policies given the current thrust of education policy discussions nationally. I provide 
examples of principal quality reform plans that are already being implemented in other 
states and assert that policymakers are adopting these policies without a comprehensive 
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knowledge of the principal labor market in American K-12 public education. I state the 
problem of insufficient student achievement for which improvements in principal quality 
might form a partial solution. Finally, I provide a rationale for this study by suggesting 
that education policymakers in Arkansas would benefit from an exploratory and 
analytical investigation of the principal labor market in the state.   
Chapter Two has three objectives. First, I discuss and critique the theoretical 
policy framework – principal-agent theory (PAT) – on which incentive-based principal 
compensation reforms are grounded. The purpose of this policy theory explanation and 
analysis is to explore whether in fact incentive-based policies are appropriate for 
education reform and how such policies might work. Second, I discuss recent related 
research about incentives in the principal labor market, a body of scholarly research to 
which this study will contribute. Third, as a foundation for policy recommendations about 
monitoring principal performance by analyzing student academic performance, I present 
literature to show that principals can, in fact, impact student achievement. This section of 
chapter two is essential for this study because policy principals’ attempts to monitor 
agent performance are a central problem in principal-agent theory. Further, policy 
recommendations calling for monitoring principal performance through data on student 
performance would be unfounded and unfair if principals were actually incapable of 
impacting student achievement outcomes. 
 I begin Chapter Three by describing features of the Arkansas principal labor 
market that are designed to ensure a high level of principal quality. Specifically, I focus 
on the barriers to entry into the labor market including licensure, certification testing, 
required experience, and completion of an authorized training program. This exploration 
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of these quality control mechanisms, which are related to principal preparation and 
qualifications, contributes to the overall discussion of policies that can positively impact 
the quality of educational leadership in the state.  In the second part of Chapter Three, I 
describe current principal evaluation practices, which are intended to solve the 
monitoring difficulty that is a part of the principal-agent theory framework. To set these 
current practices in context, I also provide a review of the literature concerning the 
dispute over the best methods for monitoring principal performance. The purpose of 
including this background is to create an understanding that it is possible for Arkansas 
policymakers to consider alternative evaluation, or monitoring, strategies. I conclude 
Chapter Three by presenting the other descriptive data related to principal pay patterns in 
the state of Arkansas and in the region. This entire chapter is descriptive and provides 
context for the study’s analysis of the principal labor market and for the policy 
recommendations in Chapter Seven.   
   In Chapter Four, I present the research questions and hypotheses of the study, and 
I describe the methods and data used to answer them. The two research questions are 
designed to uncover the factors that are associated with higher levels of principal pay and 
with larger changes in principal pay. My first research question focuses on the 
relationship between pay differentials and observable characteristics. 
 Research Question One:  To what extent is the level of principal pay impacted by 
observable characteristics of the populations they serve and of principals themselves, 
including their performance in the prior year?   
 This first research question concerns the levels of principal pay in Arkansas and 
whether there are systematic variations in salary according to principals’ observable 
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characteristics and those of the populations they serve.  This question addresses the need 
for policymakers to have a comprehensive understanding of the levels of principal 
salaries and the factors that drive variations in principal pay across the state. These 
potential patterns of variation may have implications for policy, as the placement of 
higher paid – and therefore potentially higher quality – principals among certain groups 
of students may be contributing to educational inequities across the state. Before 
designing policy solutions to ameliorate potential educational inequities, policymakers 
need a clear understanding of the principal pay and quality landscape and the nature of 
any patterns of principal sorting.  
 The second question explores if there is a positive relationship between school 
performance and annual changes in principal salaries.  
 Research Question Two: To what extent does a principal’s performance in the 
prior year impact the magnitude of the change in his or her salary? 
 This question concerns whether principals who perform better in the prior year 
(meet AYP or have higher percent proficient) earn greater salary increases year-over-
year.  The answers to the second research question will also inform the study’s primary 
policy recommendations. Understanding whether more effective principals earn 
differentially higher rewards year-over-year can inform policymakers about the 
incentives that currently exist in the principal labor market and can guide their policy 
reform decisions about how to improve principal quality. 
 Chapter Five presents the results for each of the research questions.  The first line 
of investigation for research question one involves a descriptive analysis to discern 
principal pay patterns related to their own characteristics and the characteristics of the 
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populations they serve. This descriptive analysis does not control for the factors that drive 
differences in pay, but merely portrays the reality of what types of principals are serving 
what types of student populations.  Thus, the findings for research question one include 
results for two subquestions. The first subquestion findings address: How are principals 
sorted among different student populations with regard to their own observable 
characteristics and the observable characteristics of the student populations they serve? 
That is, without holding constant the factors that impact principal salaries, are principals 
of, for example, high poverty districts and schools paid less than those in low poverty 
districts and schools? Similarly, how do other school and district characteristics, such as 
size of enrollment or percentage of the population that is minority, impact the level of a 
principal’s pay? The findings for the second subquestion for research question one 
address the following: When controlling for various independent factors that impact the 
level of principal pay, which factors drive the differences in principal salaries? For 
example, are principals of high minority schools and/or districts, small schools and/or 
districts, or high poverty schools and/or districts paid less, when holding equal all other 
factors, such as their own experience or degree level? I then present the findings for 
research question two.  
 In Chapter Six, I discuss these findings. This chapter also includes consideration 
of the study’s limitations and reflection on potential avenues for further inquiry.  
 Finally, in Chapter Seven I conclude with policy recommendations for continued 
research on this topic and for Arkansas policymakers based on the evidence provided.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
This chapter has three objectives. First, I discuss and critique the theoretical 
policy framework – principal-agent theory (PAT) – on which incentive-based educator 
compensation reforms are grounded (Davies et al., 2005; Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007, 
Billger, 2007, Podgursky and Springer, 2007). The purpose of this policy theory 
explanation and analysis is to explore whether in fact incentive-based policies are 
appropriate for education reform.  
 Second, I discuss recent related research about incentives in the principal labor 
market, a small body of scholarly research to which this study will contribute. This 
second body of literature relates directly to the literature on incentive-based reforms to 
improve principal quality and indirectly to principal agent theory, as other studies of 
related principal quality reforms are also grounded in this theoretical framework.  
Third, as a foundation for policy recommendations about monitoring principal 
performance by analyzing student academic performance, I present literature to show that 
principals can, in fact, impact student achievement. This background is important because 
policy recommendations calling for monitoring principal performance through data on 
student performance would be unfair and potentially counterproductive if principals were 
actually incapable of impacting student achievement outcomes. This third section of 
Chapter Two is linked to the rest of the study, since policy principals’ traditional 
challenges to monitoring agent performance are a central issue in the principal-agent 
framework (Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007).  
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Policy Framework: Principal-Agent Theory 
The Conventional Principal-Agent Model 
This section presents a discussion of how principal-agent theory, on which 
performance pay incentive systems are based, may be applicable to the education policy 
reform context.  Traditionally, the principal-agent theoretical framework has been applied 
to the field of economics to describe and evaluate the relationships between boards of 
directors or shareholders and managing executives (Davies et al., 2005; Bohren, 1998; 
Shapiro, 2005; Garson, 2007; Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007; Miller, 2005; Garen, 1994). 
Over the past thirty years, principal-agent models have been applied to frame 
organizational relationships in other disciplines, including sociology and political science 
(Bohren, 1998; Worsham and Gatrell, 2005). Recently, principal-agent theory has also 
been applied to conceptualize reforms in the education field, specifically those regarding 
incentive pay (Ferris, 1992; Davies et al., 2005; Podgursky and Springer, 2007; Billger, 
2007; Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007; Goldhaber, 2007).  
The central concept of principal-agent theory (PAT) for purposes of public policy 
analysis is that policy principals have goals that they need policy agents to accomplish 
(Garen, 1994; Petersen, 1993; Ferris, 1992). In a hierarchical transaction between the 
policymaker and a policy implementer, the policymaker attempts to identify performance 
indicators and to set performance incentives to create goal alignment (Worsham and 
Gatrell, 2005; Miller, 2005; Garen). Pursuant to this tasking, the agent chooses a course 
of action that may or may not be in compliance with the principal’s interests.  In the 
conventional principal-agent model, four primary assumptions exist. 
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The first assumption of PAT is that both principals and agents are rational actors 
whose acts are grounded in self-interest to maximize their own utility (Petersen, 1993; 
Waterman and Meier, 1998; Bohren, 1998; Bishop and Wossman, 2004). In a labor 
context, utility for the principal is maximized by having the agent fully accomplish the 
principal’s goals in the most efficient, cost-effective manner. For the agent, utility is 
similarly maximized by accomplishing his or her own goals with the lowest marginal 
cost, at a standard that is still satisfactory to the principal (Bohren, 1998; Bishop and 
Wossman, 2004).  Principals incur agency costs – or losses – when the utility maximizing 
behavior of agents does not fulfill the priorities of principals (Miller, 2005; Worsham and 
Gatrell, 2005).  
As a natural consequence of having self-interested actors, the second assumption 
of PAT involves the potential for misalignment of goals between principals and agents 
(Miller, 2005; Waterman and Meier, 1998; Ferris, 1992). As mentioned above, PAT 
specifies that this misalignment of preferences can lead to shirking because attending to 
the principal’s goals can involve costs to the agent, who is assumed to be self-interested 
(Miller, 2005; Sappington, 1991; Douglas, 1989; Bishop and Wossman, 2004; Bohren, 
1998; Ferris, 1992).  In the broader policy literature, goal misalignment is often viewed 
as a major challenge to policy reformers. The common term for alignment of goals is goal 
congruence, which is the level of coordination and agreement between policy principals 
and policy agents in the implementation of public policy. Meyers, Riccucci, and Lurie 
(2001) define goal congruence as: “the extent of agreement between the official or formal 
policy goals of political officials and the operative goals of the organizations or networks 
charged with delivering that policy.” Goal congruence is impacted not only by the 
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communication and monitoring of managers, but also by street-level bureaucrats’ 
discretion and perceptions of the legitimacy of a given policy and its policy principals 
(Lipsky, 1980; McDermott, 2004). 
A study by Riccucci et al. (2004) in the welfare reform policy context 
demonstrates the important role of managerial communication and monitoring in 
promoting goal congruence within a given policy context. These researchers investigated 
the extent to which front-line workers in welfare offices implemented policy changes. 
The welfare reforms of the 1990s shifted the policy focus from granting means-tested 
benefits such as food stamps to getting eligible welfare recipients off of welfare and into 
jobs. Riccucci et al. (2004) examined how front-line staff evaluated the importance of the 
reform’s goals in comparison with their traditional work of processing claims. These 
authors also looked at variation in goal priorities across agency settings and at how 
managers can influence goal priorities of front-line workers. Riccucci et al. (2004) found 
that front-line workers generally prioritized their traditional role of processing benefits 
claims ahead of the new goal of getting welfare recipients into jobs. In settings where 
managers measured claims processing, front-line workers valued those responsibilities 
the most; however, in settings where managers monitored work placements, workers 
focused on that goal first. These findings show that managers, who wish to alleviate goal 
misalignment and resulting agency costs, must clearly communicate expectations of new 
policy priorities and must measure the activities and attitudes that are most important in 
the implementation of new policy. 
Related to the study by Riccucci et al. (2004) above, the third assumption of PAT 
is that barriers often exist to inhibit the effective monitoring of agents by principals 
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(Petersen, 1993; Miller, 2005). These difficulties in monitoring may be due to 
information asymmetry, whereby the agent has a knowledge and skill advantage over the 
principal (Ferris, 1992; Miller, 2005). These monitoring difficulties and asymmetrical 
information can lead to contractual inefficiencies that benefit the agent.  It is for this 
reason that principals may seek to create incentives to motivate agents appropriately 
(Garen, 1994; Miller 2005). Incentives for performance can provide rewards for 
exceptional performance, such as through bonuses or profit-sharing (Shapiro, 2005). 
Alternatively, principals can use sanctions for poor performance, such as discontinuing 
an agent’s contract. Because agents are presumed to be are risk averse (Shapiro, 2005; 
Sappington, 1991; Garson, 2007; Douglas, 1989), the use of sanctions can be especially 
powerful to motivate goal alignment.  
The fourth assumption of conventional PAT involves the ability of principals to 
set contractual provisions unilaterally (Miller, 2005). To the degree that this assumption 
holds, principals will yield extraordinary power. In hierarchical relationships, both 
principals and agents have power. To a certain extent, however, power actually rests with 
the agent and not with the policy principal because the agent is the one who must carry 
out the principal’s directives and because the agent has an information and skill 
advantage (Miller, 2005; Garson, 2007; Waterman and Meier, 1998; Ferris, 1992).  
Revisions to Basic Principal-Agent Theory 
 
  Various scholars (e.g., Waterman and Meier, 1998; Perrow, 1986; Worsham and 
Gatrell, 2005) have proposed revisions to the basic principal-agent model and expanded 
its applicability to explain organizational dynamics in settings that do not contain all 
features demanded by the conventional PAT model.  Waterman and Meier (1998) argue 
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that two of the key assumptions behind the theory – information asymmetry and goal 
conflict – do not always hold. They offer an alternative view of the principal-agent 
relationship that in some policy contexts approximates an advocacy coalition framework.  
Though their suggestion is not entirely useful for describing the relationships between 
teachers and school principals and their policy principals, Waterman and Meier’s (1998) 
challenge to the rigid assumption of information asymmetry may have some value in 
conceptualizing the principal-agent relationship in education.  
 Waterman and Meier’s (1998) objections to the notion that there must be a 
profound information asymmetry between principal and agent may be enlightening for 
analysis of the education policy context, as it is not obvious what information advantage 
the agents in this setting have. Perhaps, the information asymmetry could lead to school 
principals or teachers arguing as agents that they should not be held accountable for 
student achievement gains because they cannot control such outcomes. By arguing from 
the position of the front-line bureaucrat that only they know how much their students can 
achieve, teachers or school principals could perhaps attempt to create a low system of 
accountability for measurable and transparent outcomes (Ferris, 1992).  
 In this study of education policy, I incorporate some of Waterman and Meier’s 
challenges to conventional PAT, but I also argue that many aspects of the conventional 
PAT are fitting.  I argue that policy principals (school boards) can employ relatively 
objective and publicly available measures to set performance targets for their agents, 
(school principals) as a way to minimize agency costs. Thus, the assumption of a 
profound information asymmetry can be resolved and need not apply in this policy 
context.  However, I do not accept Waterman and Meier’s (1998) objection to the notion 
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that goal conflict as a constant in the principal-agent model. Rather, I assert the 
applicability of this assumption in the education policy context, as conflict between 
principals and agents about policy goals in public education is a commonly accepted 
phenomenon. 
 Many scholars have also identified potential weaknesses in the explanatory power 
of the conventional PAT model because it assumes a single principal and a single agent 
(Miller, 2005; Waterman and Meier, 1998; Shapiro, 2005; Worsham and Gatrell, 2005; 
Ferris, 1992).  Citing the work of Mitnick (1973), Waterman and Meier (1998) write that 
the basic principal-agent model cannot predict which goals agents will embrace when 
they must serve multiple principals with multiple and, sometimes, conflicting goals. 
Moreover, as Shapiro (2005) notes, the basic model does not account for the fact that 
there are agents and principals who have dual roles. That is, middle managers, such as 
school principals, must attend to the directives of their superiors (school boards), while at 
the same time acting as principals monitoring the actions of agents (teachers).  
Worsham and Gatrell (2005) assert that incorporating the complexity of multiple 
principals into the principal-agent model is a sine qua non for its use. They write: 
“Agency theory, then, can offer important insights into why bureaucracy does what it 
does as long as one recognizes that the relationship is one in which multiple principals 
work to influence the actions of bureaucratic agents in a constantly evolving process” (p. 
365).  Indeed, Worsham and Gatrell (2005) convincingly argue that the traditional model 
should be extended to include consideration of the actions and incentives of agents when 
there are multiple principals, whose potentially conflicting goals may exacerbate the 
problems of goal conflict inherent in hierarchical, bureaucratic relationships. 
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 Worsham and Gatrell (2005) examined an expanded principal-agent model in 
their study of how policy principals can attempt to influence the behavior or agents 
through signaling about issue salience, rather than through direct legislative action that 
codifies agent responsibility. That is, Worsham and Gatrell (2005) were concerned with 
principals can effectively communicate their policy goals to agents through indirect 
methods. Specifically, Worsham and Gatrell (2005) studied how potential policy 
principals at the federal level have attempted to signal to agents – in the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) – that they should 
focus their efforts on particular policy goals when conducting rulemaking activities.  
 In examining how policy principals attempt to influence agents in federal 
rulemaking, Worsham and Gatrell (2005) found that signaling through indirect methods – 
e.g. the holding of hearings or media reports relating policymaker preference – has less of 
an impact on BIA agency rulemaking than on FERC agency rulemaking. Worsham and 
Gatrell (2005) hypothesized that differences in the agencies may explain this 
phenomenon. They explained that the key difference between FERC and BIA agencies 
involves the degree of complexity in the policy context.  Worsham and Gatrell (2005) 
portrayed the organizational structure, the institutional history, and the personnel 
involved in FERC as creating an environment conducive to effective signaling through 
indirect methods of communication. Regarding the BIA on the other hand, Worsham and 
Gatrell “[suggested] that the mix of policy types that constitutes BIA policy, the historical 
problems with regard to clear lines of authority and subunit coordination, the lack of 
professional training and normally low morale among BIA personnel, along with the 
congressional urge to micro-manage various aspects of BIA policy responsibilities, 
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makes the BIA a particularly difficult agent to signal” (p. 367).  Worsham and Gatrell’s 
(2005) analysis of the obstacles to achieving goal congruence in complex policy contexts 
that mirror the BIA  be instructive when policymakers are looking to cut through the 
intricate web of conflicting policy goals and messages that can confound principal-agent 
relationships. That is, Worsham and Gatrell’s (2005) analysis identifies how difficult it 
can be in certain policy contexts for policy principals to use indirect communication 
methods to align their policy goals with agent action.  
Worsham and Gatrell’s (2005) expanded principal-agent model, which includes 
multiple principals and multiple agents, is instructive for achieving goal congruence in 
education reform policy context.  Worsham and Gatrell’s (2005) description of the 
complex policy environment in which the BIA operates has many similarities to the 
education policy context in which school principals act as agents. The public education 
policy climate is marked by unclear lines of authority, a diversity of policy mandates, 
attempts of state and local policymakers to micromanage implementation, and historical 
problems regarding coordination across levels of government.  Thus, as in the complex 
BIA policy context, education policy principals may similarly find indirect 
communication about issue salience to be insufficient for achieving goal congruence.  In 
the education reform policy context, policy principals can perhaps communicate much 
more clearly and successfully by setting transparent performance indicators tied to 
performance awards as a way to signal to agents the goals that should become their 
priorities (Davies et al., 2005; Ferris, 1992). In the next section, I describe how this 
setting of financial awards, that are linked to high levels of achievement, can provide 
incentives to maximize agent efforts in a manner consistent with policy principals’ goals.  
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Setting Incentives to Resolve Perceived Goal Misalignments  
 
 As noted above, the complexity of having multiple principals and agents with 
their own priorities can lead to severe goal misalignment in public sector work, including 
education policy context (Burgess and Ratto, 2003; Propper and Wilson, 2003; 
Goldhaber, 2007). To align goals and minimize agency costs, education policy principals 
may wish to adopt performance-based compensation policies that tie compensation to 
increases in student achievement. Setting incentives tied to transparent, publicly available 
performance measures can resolve monitoring difficulties inherent in principal-agent 
relationships and can improve goal congruence by signaling clearly about policy 
priorities (Ferris, 1992). Moreover, when designed properly and implemented 
successfully, performance pay policies in education have the potential to raise student 
achievement (Lavy, 2007; Figlio and Kenney, 2006; Podgursky and Springer; 2007). 
However, policy principals (school boards) considering these pay reforms should be 
aware of threats to successful policy implementation. 
 One significant obstacle to successful implementation of performance-based pay 
reforms is teacher, or agent, buy-in. Even if policy principals, such as school boards, are 
able to agree upon using student achievement as measured on standardized tests as a way 
to monitor performance, ultimately teachers and principals have to adopt the goal of 
raising student achievement as their own priority (McDermott, 2004). That is, in 
choosing the right incentives to motivate policy actors, policymakers must they also must 
keep in mind how policy agents will respond to the incentives. One possibility is that 
educators will see themselves as having to abandon their commitments to serving the 
needs of young people because the incentives created by policy principals do not align 
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with teachers’ concepts of their duties to attend to student needs (McDermott, 2004; 
Lipsky, 1980).  As Lipsky (1980) suggested in his scholarship on street-level bureaucrats, 
educators may object to measurement of performance by student test scores and view 
these policy prescriptions and their superiors who support such prescriptions as 
illegitimate. 
In her article about the implementation of education reform policy in 
Massachusetts’s K-12 public schools during the 1990s, McDermott (2004) showed that in 
the education policy context, educators’ perceptions of the legitimacy of the leaders who 
determine education policy at both the state and local level impact the implementation of 
policy. McDermott (2004) examined how street-level bureaucrats viewed the legitimacy 
of policy mandates imposed by policy principals at the state level. McDermott explained 
that teachers at the local school level did not embrace the accountability reforms because 
they had a mistrust of the top level bureaucrats and saw them as imposing a punitive 
policy from above. McDermott showed how cooperation between state bureaucrats and 
teachers never truly occurred, and her case study demonstrates how a lack of cooperation 
can threaten goal congruence and the successful implementation of policy. To some 
degree, her findings confirm the theory Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) and deLeon and 
deLeon (2002) who note that a high level of cooperation at multiple implementation 
levels is necessary for successful policy implementation. 
 One way that policymakers can seek to get teacher and school principal buy-in to 
support performance-based pay is to involve teachers and school principals in the design 
of their merit pay plans (Heneman, Milanowski, and Kimball, 2007). Indeed, one 
characteristic of well-conceived policy is that, though the original policy intents may be 
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addressed at a hierarchically super-ordinate level, the ultimate implementation decisions 
are left to policy actors at the street level, who can develop an appropriate 
implementation strategy that would best fit their local circumstances (DeLeon and 
DeLeon, 2002). That is, even though state policymakers can mandate that localities 
implement performance-based pay that involves measuring educator success by gains in 
student achievement on standardized tests, policy principals may wish to include policy 
agents in designing performance-based pay programs the local level.  
 By tying compensation directly to student performance, as measured by their 
gains on standardized tests, policy principals in the education policy context can reform 
the institution of public education in a way that will align goals of all actors in the 
institution (Billger, 2007). An emerging body of literature has begun to explore the role 
and existence of performance incentives in school principal labor markets. In the 
following section, I describe this literature to which my study will contribute.  
Incentives in the Principal Labor Market 
  In his own study on principal compensation, Goldhaber (2007) noted that little 
research has been performed on principal compensation systems and the viability of 
performance pay programs for these school leaders. At the time of writing, Goldhaber 
(2007) succinctly stated: “there doesn’t seem to be a single large-scale quantitative study 
linking the pay structure of principals to any measure of performance that includes 
student achievement” (p. 8). My own literature review largely confirms Goldhaber’s 
assertions about the paucity of scholarship in this field. 1
                                                 
1 For the review of literature on the role of pay incentives in the principal labor market, I searched major 
academic databases, internet search engines, and reference lists of articles located. To be included, an 
  
 
 
25 
 
In addition to reviewing Goldhaber’s study, I include the work of a few other 
researchers who have begun to explore accountability mechanisms and incentives in 
school principal labor markets. For example, Cullen and Mazzeo (2008) and Billger 
(2007) have recently investigated whether some aspect of pay for performance for 
principals may already exist. Additionally, a specific program evaluation by Ladd (1999) 
considered how performance monitoring of principals can lead to changes in the 
composition of the principal workforce. These research studies constitute the small body 
of research that delves into whether principals’ career paths and compensation might be 
tied to the success of their schools in producing desired educational outcomes.   
 In his own study of principal compensation referenced above, Goldhaber (2007) 
used the principal-agent framework to explore school principal compensation generally 
and the potential presence of performance pay systems for school principals specifically. 
With three years of data (1993-94, 1999-00, and 2003-04) from the nationally 
representative Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), Goldhaber investigated the factors 
that are responsible for the variation in the level of school principals’ salaries. He 
regressed principal salary on observable characteristics of principals – including their 
race, experience, and degree level – and of the populations they served – including school 
size, school level, school racial composition, school poverty, school urbanicity – to make 
inferences about the potential presence of performance pay. Goldhaber found that 45 
percent of the variance in principal salaries could be explained by observable variables. 
In particular, he noted that “…more experience is rewarded; urban and suburban 
principals receive substantially higher salaries than those in rural schools; principals in 
                                                                                                                                                 
scholarly article had to be conducted after 1988, had to involve the compensation of school principals in the 
United States, and had to include a quantitative measure of performance or the use of principal salary data. 
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larger districts or leading larger schools receive higher salaries; and secondary school 
principals receive higher salaries than those leading elementary schools” (p. 12). He also 
found that there were significant returns to having an advanced degree beyond a master’s. 
Goldhaber (2007) then suggested that part of the unmeasured variation in principal 
salaries may be due to performance pay components. He contrasted the 45 percent of 
measured variation in principal pay due to observables to an accepted figure of 60 percent 
of measured variation in teacher salaries due to observables. Based on this difference in 
variation explained, Goldhaber (2007) proposed that it is more probable for principals 
than teachers to have part of their compensation determined by performance pay. 
  The one large-scale study of principal pay that includes performance measures 
was conducted recently by Cullen and Mazzeo (2008). Situating their study in a 
principal-agent theoretical framework, Cullen and Mazzeo (2008) analyzed the 
relationships between the performance of Texas schools between 1989 and 2006 and the 
career paths of school principals. They argued that their data set was particularly well 
suited to the investigation of this question because it “combines the ‘monitoring’ 
information – detailed campus-level scores from state-administered standardized tests – 
and the ‘incentives’ information – the complete employment and wage histories of all 
school principals during this period” (p. 2). In analyzing the career paths of full-time 
principals, they found that principals of the highest performing schools experienced 
greater increases in wages than did principals of low performing schools when moving to 
new positions. Moreover, when examining the wage changes for principals who remained 
at their current jobs, they found that principals of the highest performing schools 
similarly experienced greater wage growth than did principals of low performing schools. 
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Their findings suggest that there are implicit rewards in the principal labor market related 
to higher performance.  
  In a loosely related study mentioned by both Goldhaber (2007) and Cullen and 
Mazzeo (2008), Billger (2007) investigated whether the presence of accountability 
mechanisms leads to greater school and principal performance. Billger’s (2007) 
definition of accountability was that a school faced some level of public reporting or 
publicly communicated performance goals. However, she did not require that a school 
would face sanctions for poor performance for it to be operating under an accountability 
system. Using cross-sectional data from the 1999-2000 restricted-use Schools and 
Staffing Survey (SASS), Billger’s study is of little value. At best, her correlational 
findings regarding implicit threat of sanctions associated with public reporting give a 
glimpse into some principal pay and performance patterns.  In this study set in a pre-
NCLB public education context, Billger reports that “[state] sanctions correspond to more 
negative salaries for the worst principals and higher salaries for the best, suggesting that 
these sanctions may be an effective reward/punish system. On the other hand, [she finds] 
that other accountability measures correspond to lower salaries, particularly for the best 
principals, suggesting that strong performance may not be well-rewarded in this labor 
market” (p. 21). 
  In another related study of how accountability and performance award systems 
impact various aspect of school including principals, Ladd (1999) analyzed the impacts 
of the Dallas Independent School District’s school-based performance incentive program. 
In this program which started in 1991, schools were measured on their ability to raise 
student performance on standardized tests. Those schools that were most effective – 
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approximately the top 20 percent in the district – received financial bonuses, which were 
distributed to everyone on the school staff, including principals. In addition to seeing 
positive impacts on student performance that were at least in part attributable to the 
program, Ladd (1999) found a dramatic increase in principal turnover over the course of 
the performance incentive program’s implementation. Ladd showed that prior to the 
program, principal turnover rates in least effective schools, average effective schools, and 
most effective schools were 2.4 percent, 6.7 percent, and 6.3 percent, respectively. By the 
end of the program these rates had increased to 24.6 percent, 25.0 percent, and 24.4 
percent, respectively. Ladd (1999) asserted, “Thus, it appears that the new emphasis on 
accountability made the District much more willing than in the past to change principals” 
(p. 14). She concluded that this compositional effect on the principal workforce may have 
been due to the program and that this change, which was most dramatic in the lowest 
performing schools, could have positive impacts on student performance.   
Three conclusions might be drawn from these studies. First, higher rewards for 
performance may exist implicitly in the labor market (Cullen and Mazzeo, 2008) or 
explicitly through targeted incentive pay programs (Ladd, 1999; Goldhaber, 2007).  
Second, when pay is related to performance, there is a potential for positive outcomes, 
such as sorting more effective principals into higher paying positions (Cullen and 
Mazzeo, 2008; Billger, 2007) or the removal of potentially less effective principals from 
the profession (Ladd, 1999). Third, this important area of research has not been 
sufficiently probed, and policymakers appear to have little concrete research on which to 
base incentive policy reforms to improve principal quality.      
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These studies on policies involving pay incentives for school leaders to bring 
about gains in student academic achievement assume that principals can actually impact 
student learning. Above, I argued that agents must see the policy prescriptions as 
legitimate for successful policy implementation (McDermott, 2004; Lipsky, 1980; 
Goldhaber, 2007). For this reason, in the next section, I present research to support 
legitimacy of using student academic achievement data to monitor and reward principal 
performance. 
 
The Validity of Monitoring Principal Performance by Measuring Student 
Achievement   
 
As a foundation for policy recommendations about monitoring principal 
performance by analyzing student academic performance, I present literature showing 
that principals can, in fact, impact student achievement. As explained above, how policy 
principals attempt to monitor agent performance is a central issue in principal-agent 
theory. This background literature on how school principals can impact student outcomes 
is essential for this study because policy recommendations calling for monitoring 
principal performance through data on student performance might be perceived as 
illegitimate and unfair if principals were incapable of impacting student achievement 
outcomes. As McDermott (2004) and Goldhaber (2007) note, perceptions by agents 
(school principals) that they would be held accountable for outcomes out of their control 
might undermine chances for successful policy implementation.  
 In a meta-analysis of studies that measured the magnitude of the direct 
relationship between principals and student achievement, Marzano et al. (2005) included 
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studies after 1970 and in US schools or in school settings akin to those in the US. These 
studies all measured student achievement with a standardized achievement test and 
reported statistics that would allow for computation of effect sizes. Of the 69 included 
studies, the majority of studies (39) were conducted in elementary schools, with the other 
30 studies distributed relatively evenly over the other school levels.  
 In these studies of principal effectiveness, the independent variable was teacher 
ratings of principal leadership from questionnaires. The analysis was conducted at the 
school level, so “each school had a single summary score representing the average 
achievement of the students and one or more summary scores representing the average 
perception of teachers regarding general leadership behavior and one or more specific 
leadership behaviors of the principal” (p. 30). The authors then calculated a correlation 
between the ratings of general leadership and student achievement. They found a 
correlation of .25, and they explain this correlation to mean that an increase in certain 
principal behaviors by one standard deviation “is associated with a gain in the overall 
achievement of the school from the 50th percentile to the 60th
 Witziers, Bosker, and Kruger (2003) also conducted a meta-analysis to determine 
the degree to which principals directly affect student achievement. They framed their 
study in the context of whether holding principals responsible for student achievement is 
a reasonable and valid accountability approach. Witziers and colleagues included studies 
 percentile” (p. 30). Marzano 
et al. did not report statistically significant differences in the relationship between 
leadership and achievement at the different levels of schools. Thus, this meta-analysis 
provides some evidence that principals can impact student achievement as measured on 
standardized tests. 
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conducted from 1986 to 1996 that had valid measures both of principal leadership and of 
student achievement.  Of the 37 qualifying studies, 25 used data from the International 
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) on reading literacy in 
25 different countries. Witziers and colleagues found positive significant effects for 
principal leadership on student achievement, but their effect sizes were quite small. 
Including all studies, they found an effect of 0.02, and without the IEA studies, they 
calculated and effect size of 0.04. When isolating studies conducted in the US at the 
elementary school level, they found the effect size of leadership on student achievement 
to be 0.11. Despite the findings in this small sample, Witziers and colleagues concluded 
that principals do not directly affect student achievement and that leadership does not 
appear to matter more in US schools than in other countries. 
 Both Marzano et al. (2005) and Witziers et al. (2003) used teacher ratings of 
principal behaviors as the measure of principal effectiveness. Then, they associated 
student achievement with these teacher ratings. So the critical assumption, or link, in 
concluding that principals who are better at leadership have students who perform better 
on tests is based on the assertion that teacher ratings of principals are in fact an 
appropriate and accurate assessment of principal leadership behaviors. Using this 
methodology, Marzano et al. (2005) found a strong relationship between these two 
variables, and Witziers et al. (2003) did not.  
 As Marzano et al. (2005) point out, three differences exist between these meta-
analyses that account for the difference in their findings. First, 25 of the 37 studies in the 
Witziers et al. (2003) analysis were international studies. Second, Marzano et al. make 
more of an effort to exclude outliers in their main analysis. Third, Marzano et al. conduct 
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an attenuation adjustment to address the relatively low reliability of the study’s 
instruments. These instruments were student achievement tests and leadership behavior 
surveys, each of which had a separate reliability coefficient. This adjustment inflated 
their correlations by dividing the first correlation by the square root of the reliability of 
the instrument.  
 In reviewing the findings and methodologies of these studies, it appears that 
Marzano and colleagues have made a strong effort to show that leadership matters and 
Witziers and colleagues set out to show the opposite. The Marzano et al. study is most 
relevant for a study of leadership in US schools, but the efforts to inflate the correlation 
probably overstate a principal’s direct effect in these studies. The central finding of the 
Witziers et al. study is not particularly relevant, given that the majority of studies were 
conducted abroad. Combined with the positive, but overstated, findings of the Marzano 
study, the findings in the limited study of leadership in US elementary schools from the 
Witziers et al. study suggest that principal leadership probably does directly impact 
student achievement. However, these conclusions should be qualified because both of 
these meta-analyses use a rather suspect measure of principal leadership effectiveness – 
i.e. teacher perception surveys. 
 The majority of the studies included in these meta-analyses and of other 
descriptive studies focus on elementary school principals. A standout individual, large-
scale study by Brewer (1993) at the high school level is also worth mentioning. Brewer 
conducted his analysis on data from High School and Beyond, a national survey by the 
US Department of Education from 1980-1986 which measured the verbal and 
quantitative attainment of a representative sample of 10th and 12th grade students in 1100 
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high schools nationwide. Brewer’s dependent variable was the gain in achievement for 
those 10th
 Brewer’s study was also included in a descriptive synthesis of research on 
principals and their impacts on student achievement conducted by Heck and Hallinger 
(1998). These authors characterize the principal actions in Brewer’s study as indirect, or 
mediated. That is, Heck and Hallinger (1998) argue that principals can best contribute to 
improving the effectiveness of schools through influencing the school culture and the 
values and goals of teachers.  Heck and Hallinger’s research synthesis involved 40 
studies of principals and student achievement, of which 11 occurred outside of the US. 
Their main finding was that “principals exercise a measurable, though indirect effect on 
 graders who were tested in 1980 and then again as seniors in 1982. The 
independent variables related to principal characteristics – such as a principal’s prior 
years of experience as a teacher, prior years as an administrator, years of experience in 
current head of school role, percentage of total faculty appointed during his/her tenure, 
and the focus of a principal on academic goals – came from the Administrator and 
Teacher Survey.  Of these independent variables, the percentage of total faculty appointed 
during a principal’s tenure and the focus of a principal on academic goals had significant 
positive effects on student achievement gains. Moreover, Brewer found that “The greater 
the percentage of teachers appointed by a principal with high academic goals (PTACH) 
the higher are student test score gains; the greater the percentage of teachers appointed by 
a principal with low academic goals (PTACL) the lower are student test score gains” (p. 
286-87). Brewer’s study (1993) suggests that principals can impact student achievement 
and indicates two of the ways in which principals’ actions can lead to academic success. 
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school effectiveness and student achievement” (p. 186). They add, “While this indirect 
effect is relatively small, it is statistically significant, and we assert, meaningful” (p. 186).   
Other descriptive syntheses (e.g. Cotton, 2003; Leithwood, Seashore Louis, 
Anderson, and Wahlstrom, 2004) also point to positive impacts of principals on student 
achievement and attempt to isolate the behaviors of principals that tend to lead to greater 
student achievement.  For example, Leithwood and colleagues (2004) asserted that 
successful principals must “create and sustain a competitive school,” “empower others to 
make significant decisions,” “provide instructional guidance,” and “develop and 
implement strategic school improvement plans” (p. 26-27). In her narrative review of the 
literature, Cotton (2003) identified 25 principal behaviors that impact student 
achievement, such as creating a safe environment and being a role model of 
professionalism. 
 Based on these descriptive studies and the empirical evidence in the meta-
analyses and standout studies, it is probably fair to conclude that principals can impact 
student achievement to varying degrees. Despite the research that exists on direct 
principal impacts on student achievement, researchers such as Nettles and Herrington 
(2007) argue that there needs to be more research on direct effects of principals on 
student achievement using more recent student level data and better methodologies. 
Contrary to their views on existing direct effects studies, Nettles and Harrington 
suggested that studies of indirect effects of principals have been relatively conclusive that 
principals matter for student achievement.  
Thus, with these findings in mind, it appears that the implementation of 
performance-based pay incentives should not be undermined the legitimacy of 
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monitoring principal performance through measurement of student achievement gains. Of 
course, before holding school principals accountable for student achievement gains, 
policy principals would need to ensure that conditions are in place to support school 
principal empowerment. Otherwise, school principals may be reluctant to embrace this 
system of measurement as legitimate.  
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Chapter 3: Practices Designed to Affect Quality in the Arkansas Principal Labor 
Market 
 
 I begin this chapter by describing features of the Arkansas principal labor market 
that are designed to ensure a high level of principal quality. Specifically, I focus on the 
barriers to entry into the labor market including licensure, certification testing, required 
experience, and completion of an authorized training program. This exploration of these 
quality control mechanisms in Arkansas, which are related to principal preparation and 
qualifications, contributes to the overall discussion of policies that can positively impact 
the quality of educational leadership in the state.    
 Next in Chapter Three, I describe current principal evaluation practices, which are 
intended to solve the monitoring difficulty that is a part of the principal-agent theory 
framework. To set these current practices in context, I also provide a review of the 
literature concerning the dispute over the best methods for monitoring principal 
performance. The purpose of including this background literature is to create an 
understanding that it is possible for Arkansas policymakers to consider alternative 
evaluation, or monitoring, strategies. This chapter is descriptive and provides context for 
the study’s analysis of the principal labor market and for the policy recommendations in 
Chapter Seven.     
 The final section of this chapter is a presentation of other descriptive data related 
to principal pay patterns in the state of Arkansas and in the region. These data on average 
levels of administrator pay allow for comparisons of the findings in the study’s original 
analysis. This entire chapter is descriptive and provides context for the study’s analysis of 
the principal labor market and for the policy recommendations in Chapter Seven.   
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  The data necessary for the exploration of the topics in this chapter come from the 
Arkansas Department of Education manuals and website, various websites of Arkansas 
colleges of education, the website of the Educational Testing Service (ETS), from various 
higher education institution websites, and from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I also 
conducted phone interviews with key personnel at the Arkansas Department of Education 
to learn more about current licensure and training practices.  
Barriers to Entry into the Principal Labor Market 
One intent of requiring educators to go through certain training and licensure 
programs is to ensure that they have the knowledge and skills to be effective practitioners 
(Hess, 2001). A related aspect of principal certification is that it may deter insufficiently 
committed or incapable prospects from entering the field of school leadership. Typically, 
when professions erect barriers to entry by requiring licensure, there is a belief that the 
required coursework and past experience in the profession are directly related to future 
effectiveness (Hess, 2001). In essence, through these barriers to entry, the profession is 
attempting to establish a floor on quality. In this section, I present information about the 
various obstacles that prospective principals must overcome to obtain licensure. This 
section contains an overview of the certification process, a detailed look at the state’s 
principal training programs, and a short clarification about the different types of 
administrator licenses. This information about entry into the labor market is relevant to 
the overall study, as it provides context for investigation of performance and pay of those 
who obtain employment as principals.  
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Overview of the Arkansas Principal Certification Process 
 Principals can serve in Arkansas public schools by participating one of two 
different programs - the traditional route for principals and the Administrator Licensure 
Completion Program (ALCP) (Rules, 2003).  
 Under the traditional preparation route, principals must meet four criteria. First, 
principals must have completed four years of teaching experience, of which three years 
must have been at the level that the principal license covers (Rules, 2003). Second, the 
principal must have earned a graduate degree in educational leadership from a NCATE or 
regionally accredited administrator preparation program approved by the Arkansas 
Department of Education (Rules, 2003). If a prospective principal has earned a graduate 
degree in a field other than educational leadership, he/she can undertake a specialized 
plan of study as determined by one of the approved principal training programs in the 
state (Rules, 2003). Third, principals, who participate in an approved educational 
leadership program and those with graduate degrees in other fields, must complete an 
internship and a principal portfolio (Rules, 2003). The internship is coordinated as a part 
of the principal’s preparation program, and it places the prospective principal in an 
administrative role under the supervision of a current administrator. The principal 
portfolio is also completed as a part of the principal’s preparation program, and this body 
of work contains evidence that the candidate has demonstrated competence in the 
knowledge and skills covered by the Arkansas Administrator Licensure Standards (Rules, 
2003). The fourth requirement is that the principal have a valid Arkansas Standard 
Teacher License (Rules, 2003).   
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Upon proof of completion of these four requirements, principals can earn the 
Initial Administrator License, which is valid for up to three years (Rules, 2003). To apply 
for the Standard Administrator License, the principal must have participated in 
Administrator Induction, which is an official mentoring program that lasts between one 
and three years. During the induction period, a beginning principal works with his/her 
assigned mentor to complete a Professional Learning Plan according to state guidelines 
(Beginning Administrator Induction Program, 2007). By the end of the induction period, 
the principal must pass a state-mandated licensure principal assessment exam (Beginning 
Administrator Induction Program, 2007).  The passing score on the School Leader 
Licensure Assessment is 158 (see Table 3.1 below), and students have up to three years 
from the time of graduation from an approved program to meet this requirement 
(Educational Testing Service, 2008).  Upon completion of these requirements, a principal 
obtains the Standard Administrator License (Rules, 2003). 
 Arkansas is one of 17 states and Washington, DC, which require that principals 
pass the School Leaders Licensure Assessment (SLLA) (Educational Testing Service, 
2008). Administered by the Educational Testing Service (ETS), this six-hour exam aims 
to test whether principals can demonstrate the knowledge and skills represented in the 
ISLLC standards (Educational Testing Service, 2008). The format includes four sections 
which require the examinee to write written responses to case studies and situations in 
which a principal must decide the best course of action (Educational Testing Service, 
2008). One section also prompts examinees to analyze data related to teaching and 
learning (Educational Testing Service, 2008).  
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 The test score range on this exam is 100-200, and ETS reports that individual 
states set their own passing scores for this exam (Educational Testing Service, 2008). For 
19,364 test takers nationally from 2004-07, the median score was 178, and the reported 
average score range was 172-183 (Educational Testing Service, 2008). Passing scores by 
state are presented in Table 3.1 below.  Policymakers may want to consider if this 
relatively lenient requirement is actually accomplishing its intended goal.   
Table 3.1: State Passing Scores on the SLLA  
State* Passing Score Rank 
California 173 1 
Louisiana 168 2 
Maine 168 3 
Missouri 167 4 
Indiana 165 5 
Kansas 165 6 
Kentucky 165 7 
Mississippi 165 8 
Virginia 165 9 
Connecticut 161 10 
Washington, DC 160 11 
Arkansas 158 12 
Maryland 157 13 
Tennessee 156 14 
North Carolina 155 15 
New Jersey 148 16 
*Georgia’s score not reported. 
 
The second route for principals to serve as administrators is to participate in the 
Administrator Licensure Completion Program (ALCP), which is coordinated through the 
Office of Professional Licensure. The ACLP is an alternate administrator certification 
program for personnel who have been hired into an administrative role prior to 
completing the traditional certification route. Any one of the three administrator licenses 
can be earned through this program, and the temporary license granted to participants is 
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valid for up to three years. To participate in ALCP, a principal must have a Standard 
Teaching License, have four years of teaching experience (three years of which must 
have been at the level in which the principal is serving), be enrolled in an approved 
educational leadership graduate program, and have already been hired as a principal.  
Principals, who have not completed a traditional licensure program, may only 
serve as a building administrator in an Arkansas public school if they obtain a waiver 
from the ADE.   School districts may submit requests to the Director of the Department 
of Education for temporary waivers (up to three years) for principals who do not have 
administrator licenses if that potential principal has demonstrated applicable skills and 
knowledge. The request must include a justification of need for the waiver, the 
qualifications of the potential principal, the outcome expectations for the principal, and 
an annual accountability plan. Principals who serve successfully under the waiver 
program do not earn an initial or standard administrator license. During the 2007-08 
school year, 19 building level administrators were granted waivers and permitted to serve 
in public schools across the state. 
Training Programs for Arkansas Principals 
 A key barrier to entry into the principalship is completion of a master’s degree 
from an approved principal training program (Arkansas Department of Education, 2009). 
Nine universities in Arkansas are approved to train public school principals (building 
administrators), curriculum/program administrators, and district administrators (Arkansas 
Department of Education, 2009). These degree programs are at the following institutions: 
Arkansas State University, Arkansas Tech University, Harding University, Henderson 
State University, Southern Arkansas University, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, 
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University of Arkansas at Little Rock, University of Arkansas at Monticello, and 
University of Central Arkansas (Arkansas Department of Education, 2009). The master’s 
level coursework is offered at each of these nine universities as a part of principal 
preparation programs that lead to licensure, both for both the P-8 and 7-12 building 
administrator licenses. 
 Basic facts about the approved administrator licensure preparation programs at 
Arkansas State University, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, and the University of 
Arkansas at Little Rock are presented as examples in Appendix A. The coursework 
required for each master’s degree program can be found in Appendix B. 
The Three Administrator Licenses in Arkansas 
Completion of a master’s degree at an approved principal training program is 
necessary for licensure, but not sufficient. Moreover, there is not just one type of 
certification for principals, as the various licenses only cover certain areas of 
responsibility.  
Three levels of administrator licensure exist to qualify administrators to serve in 
public schools and public school districts in Arkansas the state. First, the building level 
administrator license, which is the basic license that covers principals, vice principals, 
and assistant principals, is issued to cover either grades P-8 or 7-12. Before a principal 
can earn the Standard Administrator License, which is valid for five years, beginning 
principals must complete the requirements associated with the Initial Building Level 
Administrator License. Second, the curriculum/program administrator licenses exist to 
certify administrators responsible for coordinating specialized programs and personnel. 
Like the building level administrator license, the curriculum/program administrator 
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licenses are issued for a certain group of grades. Curriculum/program administrators can 
be certified in the following areas: special education, gifted and talented education, career 
and technical education, content area specialist, and curriculum specialist.  The third 
administrator license is the district level administrator license which qualifies 
superintendents, assistant superintendents, and deputy superintendents. The district level 
administrator license covers grades P-12.     
This first section of Chapter Three included discussion of the training and 
licensure process that attempts to ensure a high level of quality for incoming principals. 
In the rest of this chapter, I present research about the various methods for measuring 
principal performance once they have moved through the certification process and are on 
the job. The presentation of research on the debate over methods for monitoring principal 
performance is included because policymakers should be aware that there is not 
consensus in the field about how best to evaluate principals. Armed with an awareness 
that there is not an established “best practice” when it comes to principal evaluation, 
policymakers may feel more willing to experiment with new ways to measure principal 
effectiveness. I conclude the chapter by describing the performance monitoring system 
that currently exists in Arkansas.   
The Debate over Methods for Monitoring Principal Performance 
As indicated in the discussion of principal agent theory in Chapter Two, the 
manner in which policy agents are evaluated and compensated can direct their actions 
and lead them to prioritize certain job responsibilities (Ferris, 1992; Riccucci et al., 
2004).  The debate over the best method for evaluating school principals is complicated 
by the fact that principals have multiple responsibilities and must serve a wide and 
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diverse group of stakeholders. As Green (2004) notes, principals must be master teachers, 
understand curriculum, maintain and enforce student discipline, manage building level 
finances, and serve as a human resources specialist. In these roles, principals must meet 
the often conflicting demands of teachers, students, parents, central office personnel, 
school board members, and the community at large (Slaughter, 1989; Green, 2004; 
Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007).  As such, these sundry roles and responsibilities can make the 
choices about evaluation of principal performance complicated (Brown, Irby, and 
Neumeyer, 1998).  
 In this section, I present the existing research on principal evaluation to set the 
stage for the study’s main research question regarding whether Arkansas K-12 public 
school principals are evaluated and, in fact, held accountable based on school’s academic 
performance.  This research on the current approaches to the evaluation of school 
principals provides a background for assessing the suitability of principal performance 
pay policies that rely on student achievement outcomes as a measure of principal 
performance.  
  Green (2004) asserts that the three reasons to evaluate principals involve the need 
for superintendents to have data for making informed personnel decisions, the need for 
the school board to clarify expectations to school leaders, and the need for principals to 
identify areas for professional development. These claims regarding evaluation of 
principals in the US are similar to research in Canada. For example, Thomas, Holdaway, 
and Ward (2000) found that Canadian superintendents reported evaluating principals for 
the purposes of “promot[ing] professional growth and improvement,” “provid[ing] 
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information for administrative decisions,” and “clarify[ing] and communicat[ing] role 
expectations” (p. 225).  
 Though the reasons for evaluation appear straightforward, there is less agreement 
about which of these goals in principal evaluation should be stressed the most. Not only 
is there a lack of consensus over which of the goals of evaluation should take priority, but 
there is also contention regarding the various evaluation methods used. Slaughter (1989) 
asserts that a “sound principal evaluation system has five characteristics: it pinpoints 
principal accountability; it is understandable; it is manageable; it is fair; and it is 
supported by members of the school board” (p. 3). As Ediger (2002) asserts, “there are a 
plethora of methods to use in assessing the achievement of school principals” (p. 90).  I 
have divided these evaluation methods into two categories: evaluation focused on process 
and evaluation focused on outcomes.  
The policy relevance of this study is in part related to whether changes in 
principal pay are impacted by the outcomes of a principal’s actions. The stated policy in 
Arkansas is for principal performance to be monitored based on process, not outcomes. If 
I find that principal pay is not positively impacted by student performance, then this 
finding may suggest that the stated policy is in fact being implemented. 
However, if I find that changes in principal pay are impacted by student 
performance, there will be evidence that an implicit monitoring and rewards system 
based on student outcomes is already in place. With the findings in this analysis in hand, 
policymakers who wish to introduce incentive-based policies to improve principal quality 
can better evaluate policy proposals. 
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Evaluation Focused on Process 
 Principal performance evaluation methods focused on process tend to have at 
their core a value that the principal should be an active participant in the evaluation 
process. For advocates of evaluation methods focused on process, the primary aim of 
evaluation is to promote learning and improving. Although not exclusively formative, 
evaluation methods focused on process are designed to promote reflective practice. In 
this section, I present research about three methods of principal evaluation that are 
focused on practice. For each, I provide a definition and then summarize its underlying 
principles.  
Portfolios 
 Strong advocates for the use of the principal portfolio as an evaluation tool, 
Brown and Irby (1997) define the portfolio as “a collection of thoughtfully selected 
exhibits or artifacts and reflections indicative of an individual’s experiences and ability to 
lead and of the individual’s progress toward and/or attainment of established goals or 
criteria” (p. 2).  The portfolio is often organized around the ISLLC or National 
Association for Elementary School Principals (NAESP) standards (Green, 2004). ISLLC 
standards define the characteristics and behaviors of school principals. Standard one is 
“A school administrator is an educational leader who promotes the success of all students 
by facilitating the development, articulation, implementation, and stewardship of a vision 
of learning that is shared and supported by the school community” (Missouri Professors 
of Education Administration). In constructing the portfolio, principals include narratives 
of self-reflection, and supporters of using the portfolio in principal evaluation posit that 
 
 
47 
 
the portfolio is most helpful because of its ability to promote self-assessment and 
reflection (Brown and Irby, 1997; Green, 2004).   
 Among the four potential uses of the principal portfolio, Brown and Irby (1997) 
include its suitability for summative evaluation. They argue that when districts use the 
portfolio evaluation method principals feel as though evaluation is done “to them rather 
than for or with them” (p. 5). Brown and Irby add that portfolio evaluation systems 
contribute to improved communication between principals and their supervisors and 
allow for principals to demonstrate evidence of their success in a wide variety of 
responsibility areas. Brown and Irby (1997) explain that principals include goals 
statements which demonstrate to the evaluator that the principal identifies organizational 
needs and has a plan for accomplishing those objectives. According to Brown and Irby 
(1997), the goals portion “is the heart of the portfolio,” and the accompanying 
documentation of accomplishments “provides critical information to the reviewer 
regarding the abilities, professionalism, and character of the principal” (p. 19).     
 Few studies measure the effectiveness of any of the various evaluation methods. 
In one isolated qualitative study, Johnston and Thomas (2005) described the experience 
of principals involved in a pilot project of a state-wide portfolio evaluation system for 
new principals in Ohio from 1999-2002. Ohio was one of five states that participated in 
this test of the Portfolio Assessment for School Leaders, a performance-based evaluation 
system designed by the ISLLC and the Educational Testing Service (ETS). The six 
ISLLC standards formed the basis of the portfolio. The portfolios created in the pilot 
project from the participants in the five pilot states were to be used by ETS to produce 
scoring norms. Johnston and Thomas (2005) divided study participants into three groups 
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based on whether they found the portfolio process helpful or burdensome. The authors 
ultimately concluded that portfolios can be useful for guiding professional development if 
they are implemented as a part of a larger professional development program. They 
suggested that the extra work to create a portfolio is only justified if states are interested 
in producing evidence that principals exceed minimum competency standards. 
Rating Scales 
 The use of rating scales is another method for principal evaluation that is 
primarily focused on principal processes and characteristics, rather than outcomes. The 
rating instruments often list domains – such as communication – which have a number of 
competencies listed under each, on which the supervisor scores the principal on a Likert 
scale. These scales are often constructed with reference to the standards of ISLLC and 
NAESP.   
Green (2004) describes as the use of rating scales as the most “popular” method. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the data supporting this claim come from another study 
(Green, 2002) which merely surveyed participants in a Southern California education 
administration program and their colleagues at local schools, it is safe to say that rating 
scales are currently in use in public schools. As Green indicates, this traditional 
evaluation process involves a pre-evaluation conference in which the supervisor shares 
the rating form and the rating criteria. Then supervisors collect performance indicators 
and report those findings to the principal in a post-evaluation conference. Often 
principals also fill out a self-evaluation form to facilitate the post-evaluation conference.  
360-degree Evaluation 
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 With the 360-degree evaluation approach, a principal’s evaluation is based on the 
assessments by representatives from all of the stakeholder groups that he or she must 
serve.  As Manatt (2000) notes, “360-feedback can be used at three levels: 1) for 
developmental purposes (for the employee’s eyes only), 2) for appraisal and 3) for 
compensation” (p. 2). Manatt (2000) adds that this evaluation technique can help to 
facilitate communication between leaders and their constituents.  
Dyer (2001) explains that the value of using 360-degree evaluation – also called 
multi-rater feedback and full-circle evaluation – is that principals can learn from others 
whether their actions are being perceived as intended. Dyer (2001) adds that getting 
feedback from multiple viewpoints is more fair and comprehensive than using a single 
supervisor rating. She explains that the survey instruments and questionnaires for this 
model of evaluation solicit feedback from a leader’s constituents regarding behaviors and 
skills such as delegating and communicating.   
Objecting to the practice of using of 360-evaluation for summative evaluation, 
Dyer asserts that supervisors should select this evaluation model as a way to help 
principals develop as leaders. McCauley and Moxley (1996) go further in advocating that 
360-evaluation should be a tool of formative evaluation. They explain, “One of our fears 
is that 360-feedback will be seen as the developmental event rather than as a potential 
unfreezing event that opens the individual to a developmental process” (p. 18). Thus, 
these researchers are most concerned with using this model of evaluation in the 
development of reflective leaders. 
Evaluation Focused on Outcomes  
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In contrast to evaluation methods focused on process, models for evaluating 
principals based on outcomes are intended to focus principals and the entire school 
organization on the results that the school is attempting to achieve. The underlying 
principle of measuring principal performance by outcomes is that how results are 
achieved is less important whether or not they are achieved.  In this section, I describe 
evaluation methods focused on outcomes and present the theoretical arguments both for 
and against their use. 
Among the sources that can be used in outcome-focused evaluations are data on 
student safety, student dropout rates, student attendance, student graduation rates, and 
student achievement test scores (Hoy and Miskel, 2001). Decisions regarding the 
appropriateness of possible data sources depend on the outcomes that school boards and 
other policymakers decide matter most. Given that the thrust of the current accountability 
movement is a focus on student academic achievement on standardized tests, there is a 
growing trend for policymakers to consider changes to traditional process-based 
evaluation of school principals.  
 Models of principal evaluation based on outcomes can also be classified as 
“management by objectives” models (Hoy and Miskel, 2001; Green 2004). These model 
attempt to focus principal behavior on attaining certain preset outcomes, such as distinct 
student achievement test score gains, by providing incentives for attaining predetermined 
goals (Hoy and Miskel, 2001). Green (2004) writes that in this model “The professional 
knowledge and skills that the principal will use to meet the objective are not discounted, 
but they are merely a means to the end” (p. 23).  Using slightly different terminology, 
Hogan, Curphy, and Hogan (1994) refer to outcomes-based evaluation as measuring a 
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leader by the “actual performance of [his or her] team or organizational unit” (p. 7). One 
of the primary merits of evaluation focused on outcomes rests in the objectivity of using 
results-based criteria, which are, as Slaughter (1989) notes, “much less ambiguous than a 
description of how someone behaved” (p. 58).  
Although the above authors (e.g. Slaughter, 1989; Hogan, Curphy, and Hogan, 
1994; Green, 2004; Hoy and Miskel, 2001) note that evaluation based on outcomes has 
the advantage of offering clear expectations and definitive performance measures, these 
researchers also suggest potential drawbacks to these methods.  Hogan and colleagues 
explain that the largest threat to the validity of measuring a leader by the organization’s 
performance is that the criteria used will be “contaminated.” In other words, they are 
concerned that leaders will be held responsible for outcomes that may be affected by 
events beyond their control. Green (2004) suggests that this approach can lead to 
undesirable unintended consequences, such as focusing on superficial short-term, rather 
than meaningful long-term goals. Hoy and Miskel (2001) suggest that this approach is 
problematic for evaluating principals because it reflects a top down management 
structure, which depends on a more tightly coupled organizational setting than is found in 
public education. Slaughter (1989) notes that the objection to results-based principal 
evaluation is that it assumes first that principals are capable of impacting school 
outcomes and second that they have the freedom to do so.   
 Ediger (2002) expands on these objections by listing ten perceived problems 
associated with measuring principal performance by student test scores. Among these 
objections is his argument that state-mandated standardized tests fail to capture “student 
achievement results from daily class work throughout a school year” (p. 90). Second, 
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they focus on too narrow a set of Gardner’s multiple intelligences. Third, students do not 
consider test items to be relevant or important. Ediger concludes by noting that it may not 
be fair to measure principals by student test scores because of their “not having that much 
influence over teachers to raise student test scores, [and] not having adequate time to 
work with the curriculum due to many other tasks involved in school administration” (p. 
91). 
 Indeed, an evaluation system that holds principals accountable for student 
achievement would not be fair if principals are simply incapable of impacting student’s 
academic performance. It is for this reason that I presented a summary of research that 
refutes this claim in Chapter Two. The argument that principals can impact student 
academic performance is critical for crafting incentive pay policies for improving 
principal quality. Moreover, the above discussion of school principal performance 
evaluation connects principal agent theory to the practical policy discussion because it 
helps to minimize monitoring problems and information asymmetry that lead to agency 
costs. 
Principal Evaluation in Arkansas 
The methods for principal evaluation are not standardized in Arkansas. That is, 
local districts can determine the instruments to be used, the personnel who will 
participate in conducting evaluations, and the frequency of these performance 
assessments. At the very least, principals must be evaluated annually, as they hold and 
must maintain their teaching licenses. 
Principals, like certified teachers, must complete 60 hours of professional 
development each year to maintain their teaching licenses (Rules, 2005). Each principal 
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must complete an individual professional development plan which documents how he/she 
will satisfy annual training requirements. These requirements include a minimum of three 
hours of professional development in developing relationships with parents and 
promoting parental involvement (Rules, 2005). In addition, principals must complete six 
hours of technology training annually. The other hours of professional development 
should be tailored to address an individual principal’s needs but should generally be 
focused around the topics of data disaggregation, instructional leadership, and fiscal 
management.  Each district must verify and report principals’ completion of these 
requirements annually to the Arkansas Department of Education through the Arkansas 
Comprehensive School Improvement Plan. State funding is available for approved 
professional development activities. Additionally, federal No Child Left Behind Title II 
funds associated with teacher and principal quality may be used to pay for principal 
professional development. 
Comparison of Administrator Pay in Arkansas to Other States 
In this final section of Chapter Three, I present descriptive data regarding 
administrator pay trends across the state and region to provide context for the study’s 
original findings in Chapter Five. National salary data for school principals was collected 
online from the website of the United States Department of Labor Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS). The most current information is the 2007 wage data, which was released 
in May 2008. For this question, I also gathered information about the other 16 Southern 
Regional Education Board States from the SREB website. Arkansas is a member of the 
organization, which is a non-profit group that works to improve public education. 
Comparisons among these member states can provide a regional context for 
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understanding the level of principal wages in Arkansas. These data on principal wage 
variation across the state of Arkansas were also gathered from the BLS website. I 
selected the metropolitan service areas and report the most current wage information 
below. 
Arkansas’s 246 school districts employed 2,180 elementary and secondary 
education administrators in 2007. The annual mean salary for the state’s administrators 
was $68,000, compared to the national average mean wage of $77,612. This figure ranks 
Arkansas 42nd nationally of 51 states and Washington, DC. The annual median salary for 
Arkansas education administrators in elementary and secondary schools was $68,130, 
which ranks the state 41st
 The data in Table 3.2 show that, compared to six bordering states, the mean wage 
for Arkansas administrators of $68,000 ranked the state 3
.  The national median wage was $77,880. 
rd and above the average mean 
wage of $66,410. Arkansas’s median wage for administrators of $68,130 ranked the state 
3rd and above the average median wage of $66,587. 
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Table 3.2: Comparison of Wage Data for Arkansas K-12 Education Administrators  
With Neighboring States  
State 
Number 
Employed 
Annual 
Mean 
Wage 
Mean 
Wage 
Rank 
Annual 
Median 
Wage 
 Median 
Wage 
Rank 
Missouri  4450 $72,060  1 $73,500  1 
Texas  18940 $68,110  2 $67,120  5 
Arkansas  2180 $68,000  3 $68,130  3 
Mississippi  2190 $67,740  4 $68,530  2 
Tennessee  3640 $67,220  5 $68,120  4 
Louisiana  3390 $61,030  6 $60,560  6 
Oklahoma 2890 $60,710  7 $60,150  7 
Average   $66,410    $66,587    
Data from Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data from May 2007 released May 2008. 
 
As compared to that of the 16 Southern Regional Education Board (SREB) states, 
Arkansas’s mean wage of $68,000 ranked the state 11th and was below this group’s 
average mean wage of $72,359. In comparisons of the annual median wage with SREB 
states (Table 3.3), Arkansas ranked 10th
 
 with $68,130 and was below the group’s average 
median wage of $72,318.  
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Table 3.3: Comparison of Wage Data for Arkansas K-12 Education Administrators with 
SREB States 
State 
Number 
Employed 
Annual 
Mean 
Wage 
Mean 
Wage 
Rank 
Annual 
Median 
Wage 
Median 
Wage 
Rank 
Delaware  530 $98,220 1 $100,350 1  
Maryland  5080 $88,650 2 $89,440 2  
Florida  6620 $82,480 3 $82,010 3  
Virginia  5980 $79,570 4 $78,040 5  
Georgia  6910 $78,730 5 $79,850 4  
Kentucky  3490 $72,670 6 $72,470 6  
South Carolina  3160 $70,940 7 $70,690 7  
Alabama  2960 $68,970 8 $69,190 8  
Tennessee  3640 $68,120 9 $67,220 11  
Texas  18940 $68,110 10 $67,120 12  
Arkansas  2180 $68,000 11 $68,130 10  
Mississippi  2190 $67,740 12 $68,530 9  
North Carolina  8340 $66,060 13 $63,710 13  
Louisiana  3390 $61,030 14 $60,560 14  
Oklahoma  2890 $60,710 15 $60,150 15  
West Virginia  1870 $57,750 16 $59,630 16  
Average   $ 72,359   $ 72,318   
Data from Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data from May 2007 released May 2008. 
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Administrator Pay Trends across the State of Arkansas  
In both metropolitan- and non-metropolitan regions across the state (Table 3.4), 
average wages for elementary and secondary education administrators range from 
$62,860 to $72,890. The average mean wage for these twelve regions was $66,766. Of 
course, this figure is lower than the state average of $68,000.  
 
Table 3.4: Comparison of Arkansas K-12 Education Administrators by Metropolitan 
Service Area  
 
Data from Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data from May 2007 released May 2008. 
 
Chapter Three Summary 
As policymakers are turning their focus to improving principal performance, they 
must choose how they will evaluate the effectiveness of these critically important school 
leaders. The current literature about measuring the effectiveness of school principals can 
Area name Number Employed 
Annual 
Mean 
Wage 
Mean 
Wage 
Rank 
Annual 
Median 
Wage 
Median 
Wage 
Rank 
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-
MO 280 $72,890 1 $72,650 1 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 500 $70,360 2 $71,590 2 
Fort Smith, AR-OK 220 $68,170 3 $68,020 5 
Jonesboro, AR 100 $67,770 4 $67,550 6 
Hot Springs, AR 60 $67,590 5 $69,460 4 
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 840 $67,530 6 $70,010 3 
Central Arkansas nonmetropolitan 
area 190 $66,760 7 $66,520 7 
South Arkansas nonmetropolitan area 320 $64,770 8 $64,620 10 
East Arkansas nonmetropolitan area 280 $64,720 9 $64,790 9 
West Arkansas nonmetropolitan area 160 $64,240 10 $65,240 8 
Pine Bluff, AR 110 $63,530 11 $59,970 12 
Texarkana-Texarkana, TX-AR 100 $62,860 12 $61,480 11 
Average  $66,766  $66,825  
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be characterized in two main categories. The first approach to principal evaluation 
focuses on judging principals’ characteristics and behaviors. These process evaluations 
use the following three methods: the principal portfolio, the rating scale, and the 360-
degree evaluation. The second approach centers on the concept that principals should be 
measured by the results that their organizations produce, such as student achievement test 
scores. At the heart of the debate over the appropriateness of evaluating principals based 
on outcomes is an assumption that principals can actually impact student performance. In 
Chapter Two, I presented the findings of critical syntheses and meta-analyses which 
suggest that, whether through direct or indirect means, principals can in fact play a 
critical role in improving student outcomes.  
In the final section of this chapter, I presented descriptive data on administrator 
salaries in various regions of the state and regionally. Arkansas administrators are paid 
relatively lower salaries among the SREB states and about average among neighboring 
states. The summary salary data, which demonstrate the variation in pay that exists across 
regions of the state, show that principals in the northwest corner of the state and in Little 
Rock have higher salaries than those in the other regions of the state. These data provide 
context for the study’s original findings on principal pay, which are reported in Chapter 
Five.   
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Chapter 4: Data and Methods 
 In this chapter, I present the data and methods used in the analysis of the study’s 
two main research questions. The first question investigates which factors influence the 
level of a principal’s pay. I consider the characteristics of principals themselves – such as 
their experience and degree level – and the characteristics of the populations served – 
including the school and district size, racial makeup, and poverty level. For question one, 
I run two alternate models that include cross-sectional school level academic 
performance information from the prior year. The findings from this first line of inquiry 
will also include information about principal sorting across different populations. The 
complete findings of research question one, which is primarily exploratory in nature, will 
be informative for policymakers inquiring about what factors drive differences in the 
levels of principal pay and about the settings in which higher paid, better credentialed, 
and more experienced principals are serving.   
  The second question involves an investigation of whether a principal’s 
performance – as measured by student academic test performance – impacts changes in a 
principal’s salary. This question is an important aspect of the study because the answer 
will inform the study’s primary policy recommendations. Understanding whether more 
effective principals get higher increases in pay can inform policymakers about the 
incentives that currently exist in the principal labor market and can guide their policy 
reform decisions about how to improve principal quality. 
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 Research Question One: Factors Influencing the Level of Principal Pay 
 The first research question is: To what extent is the level of principal pay 
impacted by observable characteristics of the populations they serve and of principals 
themselves, including their performance in the prior year?   
 The answer to this question will indicate whether are there systematic variations 
in salary according to principals’ observable characteristics and those of the populations 
they serve.  This question addresses the need for policymakers to have a comprehensive 
understanding of the factors that drive variations in principal pay. These potential 
patterns of variation may have implications for policy, as the sorting of higher paid – and 
therefore potentially higher quality – principals among certain groups of students may be 
contributing to educational inequities across the state. Before designing policy solutions 
to ameliorate potential educational inequities, policymakers would benefit from a clear 
understanding of the principal pay and quality landscape and the nature of any patterns of 
principal sorting. 
 The first line of investigation for research question one involves a descriptive 
analysis to discern sorting patterns of principals by their own characteristics and the 
characteristics of the populations they serve. This descriptive analysis does not control 
for the factors that drive differences in pay, but merely portrays the reality of which types 
of principals are serving which types of student populations. The question may be 
instructive for policymakers who are considering differential pay incentives to change 
principal sorting patterns.  
Thus, research question one includes two subquestions. The first subquestion is: 
How are principals sorted among different student populations with regard to their own 
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observable characteristics and the observable characteristics of the student populations 
they serve? That is, without holding constant the factors that impact principal salaries, are 
principals of, for example, high poverty districts and schools currently making lower 
salaries than those in low poverty districts and schools? Similarly, how do other school 
and district characteristics, such as size of enrollment or percentage of the population that 
is minority, impact the level of a principal’s pay?  
 The second subquestion for research question one is: When controlling for 
various independent factors that impact the level of principal pay, which factors drive the 
differences in principal salaries? For example, are principals of high minority schools 
and/or districts, small schools and/or districts, or high poverty schools and/or districts 
paid less, when holding all other factors – such as their own experience or degree level – 
equal? 
Data for Research Question One 
Principal Salary Data 
The data set of Arkansas principals was collected from the Arkansas Department 
of Education. The strengths of the data set are that it contains a large sample size with 
salary, demographic, work experience, and educational background information for each 
individual. Principals and assistant principals from all public schools K-12, excluding 
charter schools, were included for the school years from 2004-05 through 2007-08. 
Although this data set had holes, I was able to collect a large portion of the missing 
information by making email and telephone inquiries to district personnel across the 
state. In addition, I searched district websites for information about some principals’ 
subsequent career choices and salary figures.  
 
 
62 
 
The data set’s shortcomings did present some challenges. Principals are not 
identified with a unique identifier; therefore, combining data sets over multiple years 
involved creating matches on principals by name. Potential uncertainty created by 
duplicate names was settled by examining other information in the individual entries. The 
largest challenge occurred after combining data sets over a two-year period. After 
identifying which principals moved from their current position, those “movers” fell into 
two main categories. The first category of movers includes those who stayed in the data 
set. Members of this first category either switched to a new position as a principal or 
assistant principal. The second category of movers includes those who left the data set 
altogether. To fill in this missing data, I sent approximately 250 email requests to 
superintendents in the districts where those principals had served to determine the 
successive career choice for each principal who left the data set. I also searched online to 
find missing employment and salary data for some former principals for whom I did not 
receive an email response. Across the three combined data subsets (e.g. 2004-05 and 
2005-06 formed one subset), 450 principals were missing; I received information on the 
successive career choices for 187.  I was interested to determine the successive career 
choice so that I could include an estimate of salary for that individual, where possible. 
To assess secondary analysis of principal career choices, I collected data about the 
following successive career choice categories:  
1) Went back to being a classroom teacher;  
2) Moved to a central office position;  
3) Retired;  
4) Left the education profession, but did not retire;  
5) Went back to school full time;  
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6) Deceased; or  
7) Unknown.  
 
Additionally, in filling missing data and making salary estimates, the following criteria 
were applied: 
• For those individuals who went back to being a classroom teacher, I entered a 
salary estimate based on the salary schedule in that district, given the teacher’s 
experience and degree.  
• For those who moved to a central office position, I found salary figures for some 
former principals online. However, for most of these individuals, I did not locate a 
salary figure.  They were removed from the data set for the primary analyses. 
• Just as with the central office personnel for whom I was unable to locate a salary 
figure, I dropped from the analysis sample the individuals who left the education 
profession, who went back to school full-time, who were deceased, or unknown.  
• Combining records with a lack of information about successive choices, those for 
whom I could not make an accurate salary estimate, and those with missing data 
within the individual record, the total data attrition rate was 20.1%.  
District and School Poverty Levels, Extent of Minority Population, and District and 
School Size Data  
 Data for the various analyses regarding district and school poverty levels, the 
extent of the district and school minority populations, and district and school size data 
were collected from the Arkansas Department of Education Statewide Information 
System for all relevant years  
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Data on Former Principal Career Choices 
 To collect this information, I assembled a list of Arkansas school principals who 
left the data set entirely from year to year. I then emailed the superintendents of each 
district to gather data on the career choices of those who left the district. I received 
responses from 187 of 450. 
Principal Performance Data 
 To analyze how principal salaries might be affected by principal performance, it 
was necessary to select a performance variable. Because the principal is the chief 
executive of the school, I used school-wide performance information. Indeed, a 
principal’s unit of responsibility is the school building, and the academic performance at 
the school level one measure of his or her effectiveness. 
The performance variable in the study’s primary analysis is based on the Arkansas 
Comprehensive Testing Assessment and Accountability Program (ACTAAP) with regard 
to No Child Left Behind and the measure of Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP). Although 
the use of an AYP performance measure began nationally for Title I schools with the 
1994 Improving America’s Schools Act (IASA) reauthorization of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act (ESEA) (Shields et al., 2004), AYP as it is calculated and 
implemented currently in Arkansas was initiated in 2003 (Arkansas Department of 
Education, 2008).  
The goal of NCLB’s AYP measure is to for the state to ensure that 100 percent of 
students will be proficient in mathematics and reading/language arts by 2013-2014 school 
year (Arkansas Department of Education, 2008).  In practice, this 100 percent proficiency 
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goal of NCLB has led Arkansas to establish a performance baseline and have divided the 
gap between 100 percent proficiency and the baseline into twelve annual proficiency 
goals (Arkansas Department of Education, 2008). The baselines for each of the grade 
levels (K-5, 6-8, and 9-12) are presented in the table below: 
Table 4.2: Adequate Yearly Progress Baseline Percent Proficient for Literacy and 
Mathematics by Subject 
School 
Level 
(Grades) 
Subject 
Baseline Percent 
Proficient      
(Revised 2006) 
Annual 
Gain 
Needed to 
Meet AYP 
K to 5 Literacy 42.4 7.20 
K to 5 Mathematics 40.0 7.50 
6 to 8 Literacy 35.2 8.10 
6 to 8 Mathematics 29.1 8.86 
9 to 12 Literacy 35.5 8.06 
9 to 12 Mathematics 29.2 8.85 
Data Source: Arkansas Department of Education (2008) 
 
All Arkansas schools participate in this accountability program, which involves 
annual testing scheduled at varying times during the school year. The current AYP 
calculation system was adopted in for the 2007-2008 school year, but the testing and 
AYP system that were in place during the testing time period of this study – testing years 
2004-05 to 2006-07 – operated differently. During the time period of this study, to make 
Adequate Yearly Progress, a school must have been above the percent proficient bar each 
year in both Literacy and Mathematics (Arkansas Department of Education, 2008). The 
percent proficiency was calculated as a three year average of the percent of students 
scoring above a certain cut score on a given exam (Arkansas Department of Education, 
2008). For example, if a K-5 school was at 60 percent proficient in Literacy in 2005-06 
(based on the test scores for 2003-04, 2004-05, and 2005-06) and at 40 percent proficient 
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in Mathematics, that school would have made AYP.  That school would have been 
designated as “Meets Standards” for the 2006-07 school year. On the 2006-07 testing in 
Mathematics, the school would have needed for its new three-year-average percent 
proficient average (based on testing in years 2004-05, 2005-06, and 2006-07) to reflect an 
increase of 7.5 percent of its students scoring proficient to make AYP again. If that 
school were to have maintained, or even declined, in the percent of its students who 
scored proficient in Literacy, it would have continued to make AYP, provided the three-
year-average of the percent of students scoring proficient was above the proficiency bar 
of 49.6.  
Under both the older and current AYP systems, when a school fails to make AYP 
for two consecutive years, it is designated as in “School Improvement”. Each year that 
the school fails to meet AYP, the schools moves farther down the School Improvement 
Status ladder. Each successive categorization of the School Improvement Status is to 
result in increasingly stringent sanctions. The table below, adapted from Arkansas 
Department of Education documents, lists the sanctions to be applied for failure to meet 
AYP. 
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Table 4.3: School Performance and Actions/Sanctions Associated with Varying Levels 
 of Improvement Status 
 
School Performance School Improvement Status for the Following Year Action/Sanction 
First year a school’s 
performance is below 
AYP starting point or 
first year a school or 
school district fails to 
make adequate yearly 
progress.  
 
Review school 
improvement plan and 
establish professional 
development needs for 
faculty and staff 
Second year of a 
school’s failure to 
make AYP. 
 
School Improvement Status 
(Year 1) 
School must provide 
choice option for 
students to attend 
another school in the 
district not in 
improvement. May, at 
the option of the 
school/district offer 
supplemental services if 
choice is not an option. 
Third year of a 
school’s failure to 
make AYP 
 
School Improvement Status 
(Year 2) 
School must continue to 
provide choice and add 
the option of 
supplemental services to 
students who qualify. 
Fourth year of a 
school’s failure to 
make AYP 
 
School enters corrective action 
status (Year 3) 
The State is required to 
establish and implement 
a plan of corrective 
action 
Fifth year of a school’s 
failure to make AYP. 
 
Reconstruction status 
(Year 4) 
The State is required to 
act to restructure the 
identified school. 
 
Although the designation of meeting or failing AYP may be considered a poor 
measure of school quality for a variety of reasons, I chose it as a measure of principal 
performance because it is an accepted, publicly reported signal of school quality per 
federal law. It is conceivable that superintendents and school boards involved in school 
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principal hiring decisions might judge the quality of a school, and therefore its principal, 
by whether or not the school made AYP.  
I did, however, use a second measure of school performance in addition to the 
AYP designation as a principal performance variable. The second performance variable 
included in this study was a combined percent proficient and advanced variable on math 
and language on state academic assessments for the school in which the principal served 
in the prior year. This percent proficient variable was primarily chosen because it has a 
more continuous quality, ranging from 0 to 100. Again, it is plausible that 
superintendents and school boards involved in school principal hiring decisions might 
judge the quality of a school, and therefore its principal, by whether or not the school had 
a high percentage of students at the level of proficient or above. It is true that both 
performance measures – AYP and percent proficient – do not take into account the fact 
that principals may be serving different types of student populations. These absolute 
measures are, however, the publicly reported and readily available measures of school 
performance.  
Methods for Question One 
This analysis is designed to determine the relative impact that various factors have 
on differences in the level of principal pay. For examples, the factors that might be 
expected to lead to variations in principal pay may include: a principal’s experience, 
degree level, district or school size, district or school wealth, district or school minority 
percentage, and school level – elementary, middle, and high. To estimate the relative 
magnitude and significance of these potential factors, I conducted three different analyses 
using OLS regression. The primary difference is that the first equation does not include 
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performance data from the prior year. The second and third equations differ in the type of 
performance data used. The equations are below. Variables included in these models are 
informed by the previous related studies (Cullen and Mazzeo, 2008; Goldhaber, 2007) of 
principal pay. Some of the differences in the models below and those in previous studies 
concern data limitations.   
Question One – Model 1 (No performance data included) 
Ysalaryt
β5degreedoctorate + β6experience + β7districtsize + β8districtpoverty + 
β9districtminority + β10districtwealth +  β11schoolsize  + β12schoolpoverty + 
β13schoolminority + β14female + β15principalminority +  β16_year2006-07 + 
β17_year2007-08 +  e 
 =  β0 + β1middle + β2high + β3degreeBA + β4degreespecialist +  
  
Question One – Model 2 (Includes AYP performance data) 
 
Ysalaryt
β5degreedoctorate + β6experience + β7districtsize + β8districtpoverty + 
β9districtminority + β10districtwealth +  β11schoolsize  + β12schoolpoverty 
+ β13schoolminority + β14female + β15principalminority +  β16_year2006-
07 + β17_year2007-08 +  β18meetstandards
 = β0 + β1middle + β2high + β3degreeBA + β4degreespecialist +  
t-1
 
 + e 
Question One – Model 3 (Includes Percent Proficient/Advanced) 
 
Ysalaryt
β5degreedoctorate + β6experience + β7districtsize + β8districtpoverty + 
β9districtminority + β10districtwealth +  β11schoolsize  + β12schoolpoverty + 
β13schoolminority + β14female + β15principalminority +  β16_year2006-07 + 
β17_year2007-08 +  β18percentproficient
 = β0 + β1middle + β2high + β3degreeBA + β4degreespecialist +  
t-1
 
 + e 
 
Table 4.1: Research Question One Variables and Variable Descriptions 
Variable Name Variable Description  
Salary
The dependent variable in this equation is a 
principal’s salary in dollars in a given year 2005-06, 
2006-07, or 2007-08. t 
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β0 
This is a constant. It represents the average salary in 
dollars earned by a male, elementary principal during 
the 2004-05 school year, with a master’s degree, zero 
years of experience, a district population of zero 
students, and a district Free and Reduced Lunch 
population of zero. 
Middle and high 
These are school level variables, and elementary is 
the omitted category. The coefficients on these 
dummy variables represent the return to a principal in 
dollars of salary for working in a middle or high 
school relative to working in an elementary school, 
holding all else constant. 
degreeBA, degreespecialist, 
and degreedoctorate 
 
These are principal degree levels, and degreeMA is 
the omitted category. The coefficient on these dummy 
variables represent the salary increases in dollars that 
are attributable to having a BA, specialist, or 
doctorate degree, as compared to having a master’s 
degree, holding all else constant. 
 
Experience 
The coefficient on this continuous variable relates the 
marginal increase in salary due to annual increase in 
experience on the job, holding all else constant. 
districtsize  and schoolsize 
 
These continuous variables relate the marginal 
increase in salary due to a single student increase in a 
district or school enrollment, holding all else constant. 
districtpoverty and 
schoolpoverty 
These variables range from 0 to 100 as a percent and 
represent the variation in salary that is due to a  
marginal increase in the percent of students in a 
district or school that are eligible for Free or Reduced 
Lunch, holding all else constant. 
Districtwealth 
This variable ranges from 0 to 1, where larger values 
represent higher district wealth. This variable is a 
state figure used in facilities funding, and it represents 
the revenues raised based on the local tax base. 
Specifically, it is defined as the result of one (1) 
minus the ratio of local revenue per student divided 
by the difference between foundation funding and 
local revenue per student. 
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Districtminority and 
schoolminority 
These variables range from 0 to 100 as a percent and 
represent the variation in salary that is due to a  
marginal increase in the percent of students in a 
district or school that are non-white, holding all else 
constant. 
Female 
This is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for 
principals who are female. The coefficient on this 
indicator variable represents any variation in salary 
that may be systematically related to a principal’s sex, 
holding all else constant. 
Principalminority 
This is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for 
principals who are non-white. The coefficient on this 
indicator variable represents any variation in salary 
that may be systematically related to a principal’s 
being non-white, holding all else constant. 
year2005-06, year2006-07, 
and year2007-08  
These are year dummy variables, for which the 
coefficients represent the dollar differences in salary 
that exist each  year relative to the salary in year 
2004-05, holding all else constant. 
meetstandards 
 
t-1 
The coefficient on this performance variable relates to 
the dollar difference in level of salary that is 
attributable to meeting performance standards (i.e. 
meeting AYP) on the state academic performance 
assessments at the school level. A positive and 
significant coefficient indicates that principals of 
schools that meet standards receive a larger salary as 
a result of their performance that is over and above 
what is earned on average simply by staying on the 
job for another year, holding all else constant. 
percentproficient 
This performance variable is an average of the 
percent proficient or advanced in reading and math on 
the state academic performance assessments at the 
school level in year t-1. The coefficient on this 
variable equals the dollar salary increase that 
corresponds to a one percent increase in school 
proficiency on the state assessment, holding all else 
constant. 
t-1 
E 
 
The error term represents any source of variation in 
salary that is not accounted for by the independent 
variables included in the model. 
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Summary of Analytic Strategy for Question One 
As a first step in the study’s analysis, I explore how principals with varying 
characteristics are sorted among the districts and schools of Arkansas, without holding 
constant variables that can impact the level of principal pay. I divide the schools and 
districts into various groups (quintiles) based on their characteristics (percent FRL, 
percent minority, percent, etc). I also present basic principal sorting and pay patterns by 
school level (elementary, middle, high). 
These basic statistics tell whether principals in certain settings tend to have higher 
pay, experience, or degree level.  The fact that higher paid principals are in, for example, 
larger districts may have to do with the fact that the larger districts pay better, or it could 
be due to their being more experienced and better trained. For this reason, I then conduct 
the regression analysis to determine what factors are actually driving the differences in 
pay. Any differences between the analysis of principal pay with and without controls for 
the various factors that impact pay will be informative for policymakers, who wish to 
provide incentives to motivate certain changes in principal behaviors. After conducting 
the combined sample analyses, I then conduct subgroup analyses by school level. 
 
Research Question Two: Factors Influencing Changes in Principal Pay 
 The second research question is: To what extent does a principal’s performance in 
the prior year impact the magnitude of the change in his or her salary? 
 This second research question involves a direct investigation of whether a 
principal’s performance impacts changes in a principal’s salary. This question is 
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measured by examining the school level academic performance on state-mandated 
standardized tests of a principal’s school in the prior year. The reason that I use building 
level academic performance data is because the principal’s unit of assignment is the 
school.  The significance of this question is that it provides a better understanding of 
whether more effective principals get higher increases in pay. These findings can inform 
policymakers about the incentives that currently exist in the principal labor market and 
can guide their policy reform decisions about how to improve principal quality. 
Data for Research Question Two 
Principal Performance Data 
To analyze how changes in principal salaries might be affected by principal 
performance, it was necessary to select a performance variable. Because the principal is 
the chief executive of the school, I used school-wide performance information, as in 
question one. Indeed, a principal’s unit of responsibility is the school building, and the 
academic performance at the school level one measure of his or her effectiveness. 
Principal Salary Data 
 
The principal salary data used for this research question is described above under 
research question one. 
Methods for Research Question Two 
 To investigate the existence and magnitude of the relationship between increases 
and salary and school performance, I conducted three separate analyses. First, I regressed 
the salary in a successive year on the prior year salary, a school performance variable, 
and indicator variables for change in degree. The model intentionally excludes anything 
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that might be related to earning a higher salary as a result of better performance. That is, 
the model is allowing for high performing principals to sort themselves into higher 
paying jobs in better paying districts or to move to higher paying jobs, such as the 
superintendency or a spot in a bigger school district.   As the preliminary descriptive 
analysis indicates, for example, there may returns to working in a larger district or at 
various school levels (elementary, middle, high). Second, I dropped out the change in 
degree variables to determine if these variables have a practical impact the coefficients. 
Third, I changed the performance variable from “meets standards,” a dichotomous AYP 
measure, to a more continuous variable, a measure of proficiency on state academic 
assessments. The equations are below, and as with question one described above, the 
inclusion of control variables is informed by previous studies cited in Chapter Two.   
Question Two - Model 1 (AYP performance and change in degree) 
 
Ysalaryt = β0 + β1salaryt-1 + β2meets_standardst-1 + β3earn_specialistt-1  + 
 earn_doctoratet-1
 
 + βyear2006-07 +  βyear2007-08 +  e     
Question Two – Model 2 (AYP performance; no change in degree) 
 
Ysalaryt = β0 + β1salaryt-1 + β2meets_standardst-1
 
 + βyear2006-07 +  βyear2007-08 +  
e 
Question Two – Model 3 (percent proficient/advanced; no change in degree) 
 
Ysalaryt = β0 + β1salaryt-1 + β2percentproft-1
 
 +  β3year2006-07 +  β4year2007-08 +  e 
 
 
 
Table 4.4: Research Question Two Variables and Variable Descriptions 
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Variable Name Variable Description 
salary 
This is the salary in dollars earned by a principal or 
former principal in one of three school years: 2005-06, 
2006-2007, or 2007-08. 
t 
Β0 
 
This is a constant. It represents the average salary for all 
principals in time t-1. 
salary 
 
t-1 
The is a principal’s salary in dollars in time t-1. The 
coefficient on this variable represents a portion of the 
change in an individual’s salary between times t and t-1 
that is dependent on the magnitude of the salary in time 
t-1,holding all other factors constant. 
 
earn_specialist 
This a dummy variable that equals 1 when a principal 
earns a specialist degree in time t-1. The coefficient on 
this variable represents the return in dollars of salary in 
year t when a principal moving from a master’s degree to 
a specialist degree. This change variable is included in 
the model because any increase in salary that is due to a 
difference in degree is unrelated to the potential return to 
meeting performance standards, holding all else constant. 
earn_doctorate 
This a dummy variable that equals 1 when a principal 
earns a doctorate degree in time t-1. The coefficient on 
this variable represents the return in dollars of salary in 
year t when a principal moving from a specialist degree 
to a doctorate degree. This change variable is included in 
the model because any increase in salary that is due to a 
difference in degree is unrelated to the potential return to 
meeting performance standards, holding all else constant. 
 
meets_standards 
The coefficient on this performance variable relates to 
the dollar change in salary that is attributable to meeting 
performance standards (i.e. meeting AYP) on the state 
academic performance assessments at the school level. A 
positive and significant coefficient indicates that 
principals of schools that meet standards receive an 
increase in salary as a result, that is over and above what 
is earned on average simply by staying on the job for 
another year, holding all else constant. 
t-1 
 
percentprof t-1
This performance variable is an average of the percent 
proficient or advanced in reading and math on the state 
academic performance assessments at the school level in 
year t-1. The coefficient on this variable equals the dollar 
salary increase that corresponds to a one percent increase 
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in school proficiency on the state assessment, holding all 
else constant. 
 
year2006-07 and 
year2007-08 
These dummy variables are included to account for the 
average change in pay that occurs annually which is 
unrelated to performance. The coefficients represent 
dollar increases in salary simply for being a principal in 
the following year, holding all else constant. The omitted 
category is year2005-06. 
E 
This error term includes the unmeasured sources of 
variation not accounted for by the independent variables 
included in the model. 
 
Chapter Four Summary 
 
As a first step in the study’s analysis, I explore pay patterns for principals with 
varying characteristics and how these principals are distributed among the districts and 
schools of Arkansas, without holding constant variables that can impact the level of 
principal pay. This descriptive analysis involves comparisons of principal groupings 
based on principal characteristics and the characteristics of the populations served. These 
basic statistics tell whether principals in certain settings tend to have higher pay, 
experience, or degree level.  The fact that higher paid principals are in, for example, 
larger districts may have to do with the fact that the larger districts pay better, or it could 
be due to their being more experienced and better trained. For this reason, I then conduct 
the regression analysis to determine what factors are actually driving the differences in 
pay. Any differences between the analysis of principal pay with and without controls for 
the various factors that impact pay will be informative for policymakers, who wish to 
provide incentives to motivate certain changes in principal behaviors. 
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Next, to investigate the existence and magnitude of the relationship between 
increases and salary and school performance, I conduct three separate analyses. First, I 
regress the salary in a successive year on the prior year salary, a school performance 
variable, and indicator variables for change in degree. The model intentionally excludes 
anything that might be related to earning a higher salary as a result of better performance. 
That is, the model is allowing for high performing principals to sort themselves into 
higher paying jobs in better paying districts or to move to higher paying jobs, such as the 
superintendency or a spot in a bigger school district.    
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Chapter 5: Findings 
 In this chapter I present the findings for the two primary research questions. 
Research question one is: To what extent is the level of principal pay impacted by 
observable characteristics of the populations they serve and of principals themselves, 
including their performance in the prior year? Additionally, because there may be 
patterns in the performance variables at each of the three school levels, I analyzed 
principal subgroups by school level.   Alongside the findings for question one, I present 
descriptive analysis of principal pay patterns across different school types based on the 
pay incentives that exist in the labor market.  In the final part of the chapter, I present the 
findings of research question two: To what extent do current pay and evaluation policies 
reward school principals for performance with increases in pay?  
Findings of Research Question One: Factors Influencing the Level of Principal Pay 
 Table 5.1 below is a presentation of the complete findings for research question 
one, which explores the factors that impact the level of a principal’s salary.  After the 
complete findings table, I divide the various independent variables into groups and 
discuss the impact of each group separately. In each variable group discussion, I first 
present descriptive information about principal pay patterns with reference to certain 
district and school characteristics, and then I present data from the regression analysis to 
investigate if there is a difference between the controlled and uncontrolled relationships 
with the given variables and principal salaries. 
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Table 5.1: Regression Coefficients for Question One – Factors that Impact the  
Level of a Principal’s Salary from 2005-06 to 2007-08 
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124) 
for Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093) 
Variable 
 Model 1                
(No Performance 
Data)  
Model 2 
(AYP Data) 
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
Experience (years) 
 160.20**         
(21.15)  
159.93**     
(21.15) 
158.31**      
(21.25) 
Female 
 -633.54        
(401.22)  
-638.89      
(401.20) 
-710.78      
(405.30) 
Principal Minority (non 
white) 
 -905.10      
(613.67)  
-877.95   
(613.98) 
-689.18       
(626.16) 
BA 
 -4813.11*     
(1506.88)  
-4748.57*     
(1507.58) 
-4742.76*       
(1507.25) 
MA (Omitted) ----- ----- ----- 
Specialist 
 2619.09**      
(467.86)  
2613.92**      
(467.83) 
2656.32**       
(470.68) 
Doctorate 
 5321.44**      
(935.91)  
5389.72**       
(937.38) 
5258.16**       
(950.45) 
Elementary School (Omitted) ----- ----- ----- 
Middle School 
 3575.33**     
(496.51)  
3668.60**    
(501.97) 
4016.51**       
(514.21) 
High School 
 4253.74**    
(534.57)  
4308.74**    
(536.31) 
4950.29**       
(583.76) 
District Enrollment 
 .80**                  
(.04)  
.80**      
(.04) 
.80**      
(.04) 
District _FRL% 
 -83.31*            
(28.03)  
-82.97*      
(28.03) 
-92.16**        
(28.34) 
District_Minority% 
 58.38*            
(26.95)  
58.79*     
(26.95) 
65.60*         
(27.27) 
District_Wealth 
26.78*   
(10.56) 
26.34*   
(10.57) 
24.53*    
(10.63) 
School Enrollment 
 14.11**               
(0.75)  
14.25**      
(.76) 
14.01**      
(.76) 
School_FRL% 
 -3.97                 
(23.42)  
-2.82          
(23.43) 
13.44       
(24.05) 
School_Minority% 
 -7.06             
(24.84)  
-4.27       
(24.94) 
-2.03        
(25.37) 
Year 2005-06 ----- ----- ----- 
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Year 2006-07 
 3357.48**       
(429.42)  
3362.59**     
(429.39) 
3152.76**       
(441.89) 
Year 2007-08 
 6237.82**         
(432.60)  
6253.60**        
(432.74) 
5746.59**         
(462.77) 
Meets_AYP  -----  
606.54       
(482.66) ----- 
Average % proficient time t-1  -----  ----- 
44.78*      
(15.42) 
Intercept 
 68,631.30**         
(1,337.33)  
67,913.54**    
(1,54.06) 
65,468.37**       
(1,715.44) 
N observations 2570 2570 2538 
R2  0.541  0.542 0.540 
Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth,  
and race variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year 
indicator variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s degree, 
Male, Year 2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at p<0.05; 
**Significant at p<0.01 
 
Next, I present the regression coefficients for the subgroup analysis of Question 
One, which is an examination of the extent to which various factors impact principal pay 
by school level – elementary, middle, and high school. Here, I only present the 
coefficients from Question One Model 3, which includes the percent proficient 
performance variable,2
                                                 
2 To explore the possibility that superintendents and school boards might also use change in percent 
proficient as a crude growth measure as an indicator of principal performance, I ran the models for both 
question 1 and question 2 including this performance variable. In these alternative models, principal 
performance, as measured by change in percent proficient, did not have a statistically significant positive 
impact either on the level of pay or the change in pay. 
 for each subgroup and for the complete analysis sample. Model 3 
includes the better performance variable. All three models for each subgroup are included 
in Appendix C. 
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Table 5.2: Regression Coefficients for Question One Analysis of School Level  
Subgroups – Factors that Impact the Level of a Principal’s Salary from 2005-06 
 to 2007-08 
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $86,000; SD $13,093) 
Variable 
Elementary 
School              
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
Middle 
School  
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
High     
School  
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
Combined 
Sample 
Model 3   
(Percent 
Proficient) 
Experience (years) 139.20**      (28.74) 
57.45**      
(0.19) 
267.05**      
(44.36) 
158.31**      
(21.25) 
Female 1.43        (525.07) 
-1391.62      
(751.63) 
-1188.02      
(1039.89) 
-710.78      
(405.30) 
Principal Minority (non 
white) 
-1669.04*       
(742.91) 
1009.78       
(1444.80) 
1704.91       
(1680.49) 
-689.18       
(626.16) 
BA -5971.00**       (2249.50) 
-3619.42**       
(2954.22) 
-4473.58       
(2834.48) 
-4742.76*       
(1507.25) 
MA (Omitted) ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Specialist 2557.18**       (638.27) 
3995.10**       
(864.41) 
1560.28       
(1094.73) 
2656.32**       
(470.68) 
Doctorate 6895.68**       (1338.32) 
4664.68**       
(1478.88) 
3520.93      
(2528.21) 
5258.16**       
(950.45) 
District Enrollment .74**          (.06) 
.82**          
(.10) 
.76**          
(.13) 
.80**           
(.04) 
School Enrollment 13.01**         (.76) 
17.18**      
(2.11) 
14.61**      
(1.40) 
14.01**      
(.76) 
District_Minority% 46.22         (30.45) 
88.62         
(81.82) 
-39.67        
(96.36) 
65.60*         
(27.27) 
School_Minority% 7.87         (27.53) 
7.12         
(80.60) 
86.91         
(92.74) 
-2.03        
(25.37) 
District _FRL% -77.95*            (28.03) 
-152.38**        
(32.61) 
-32.35       
(82.46) 
-92.16**        
(28.34) 
School_FRL% -25.60                 (26.20) 
92.02       
(76.65) 
-54.61       
(69.35) 
13.44       
(24.05) 
District_Wealth 58.35**    (14.68) 
.63       
(21.27) 
-25.27      
(21.78) 
24.53*    
(10.63) 
Elementary School 
(Omitted) ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Middle School ----- ----- ----- 4016.51**       (514.21) 
High School ----- ----- ----- 4950.29**       (583.76) 
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Average % proficient time t-
1 
45.37*      
(19.49) 
109.71**      
(40.23) 
8.48      
(34.34) 
44.78*      
(15.42) 
Year 2005-06 ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Year 2006-07 2930.41**       (590.06) 
3202.10**       
(895.36) 
3584.80**       
(928.88) 
3152.76**       
(441.89) 
Year 2007-08 5236.24**         (629.64) 
5677.85**         
(975.76) 
6670.35**         
(932.69) 
5746.59**         
(462.77) 
Intercept 65, 984.14**       (2,291.14) 
65, 731.23**       
(3,724.04) 
69,819.54**       
(3,266) 
65,468.37**       
(1,715.44) 
N observations 1341 508 697 2538 
R2 0.523 0.620 0.526 0.54 
 
 
 
The Extent to Which Principal Characteristics Impact the Level of Principal Pay  
The descriptive statistics below include information regarding principal 
experience, sex, and minority status with respect to school level – elementary, middle, 
and high school.  These statistics provide information about principal pay patterns for 
principals with varying characteristics relative to different school levels. I then compare 
these descriptive findings to those from the question one regression analysis that focuses 
on how a principal’s demographics impact the level of his or her pay, while holding 
constant other observable factors that might influence the level of a principal’s salary.  
Tables 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 show aspects of principal pay patterns among the three 
levels of schooling based on selected principal characteristics for a three-year period from 
2005-06 to  2007-08. Table 5.3 reveals two interesting patterns. First, there are 
disproportionately more female principals serving in elementary grades, and second, 
there is a small percentage of minority principals across all levels of schooling. The 
largest percentage of minority principals can be found in elementary grades (17 percent 
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non-white). The total percentage of minority principals across all grade levels for this 
time frame was 14 percent.  
Table 5.4 shows that very few principals at any level hold either bachelor’s or 
doctorate degrees. Overwhelmingly, principals hold master’s degrees; the only real 
source of variation in credential by grade level is that middle schools appear to be staffed 
at a greater percentage (than either elementary or  high schools) with principals holding 
specialist degrees. Table 5.5 shows that there are relatively proportionate distributions of 
principals holding various degrees across all levels of schools. For example, 52 percent of 
all principals serve in elementary schools, and 53 percent of all principals with master’s 
degrees serve in elementary schools. Again, middle schools are staffed with a 
disproportionately higher share of principals with specialist and doctorate degrees. 
Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics of Principal Characteristics by  
School Level from 2005-06 to 2007-08 
School Level Elementary Middle High Total 
N Total 1341 512 717 2570 
Average Experience (years) 23.57 22.52 21.9 22.89 
Range Experience (years)  0-47 0-46 0-48 0-48 
N Female 910 199 125 1234 
Percent Female by Level 68% 39% 17% 48% 
N Minority 236 68 60 364 
Percent Minority by Level 18% 13% 8% 14% 
Sample N = 2,570 is for all individuals with a complete record. 
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Table 5.4: Number and Percent of Principals by Highest 
Degree Level Attained from 2005-06 to 2007-08 
School Level Elementary Middle High Total 
N Bachelor’s 15 8 13 36 
Percent Bachelor's 1% 2% 2% 1% 
N Master's 1046 341 575 1962 
Percent Master's 78% 67% 80% 76% 
N Specialist 235 127 110 472 
Percent Specialist 18% 25% 15% 18% 
N Doctorate 45 36 19 100 
Percent Doctorate 3% 7% 3% 4% 
Sample N = 2,570 is for all individuals with a complete record. 
 
 
Table 5.5: Distribution of Principals with a Given Degree by School Level 
from 2005-06 to 2007-08 Compared to that School Level’s Share of Total 
Principals in the Data Set  
 
Percent 
Bachelor's 
Percent 
Master's 
Percent 
Specialist 
Percent  
Doctorate 
School Level 
Share of Total 
Elementary 42% 53% 50% 45% 52% 
Middle 22% 17% 27% 36% 20% 
High 36% 29% 23% 19% 28% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Sample N = 2,570 is for all individuals with a complete record 
 
Table 5.6, which is the analysis of the combined sample, below shows that, as 
with teacher pay, a principal’s own characteristics appear to impact his or her salary. 
Principal pay is significantly affected by experience and degree level. For each year of 
experience, a principal can expect to see a salary increase of approximately $160. 
Further, principals with specialist and doctorate degrees tend to earn approximately 
$2,520 and $5,300 dollars more than principals with master’s degrees respectively. Those 
principals with only a bachelor’s degree tend to earn approximately $4,775 less than 
principals with masters’ degrees.  
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Table 5.6: Relationship between Principal Characteristics and Salary 
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124) 
for Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093) 
Variable 
 Model 1                
(No 
Performance 
Data)  
Model 2 
(AYP Data) 
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
Experience (years) 160.20**         (21.15) 
159.93**     
(21.15) 
158.31**      
(21.25) 
Female -633.54        (401.22) 
-638.89      
(401.20) 
-710.78      
(405.30) 
Principal Minority (non white) -905.10      (613.67) 
-877.95   
(613.98) 
-689.18       
(626.16) 
BA -4813.11*     (1506.88) 
-4748.57*     
(1507.58) 
-4742.76*       
(1507.25) 
MA (Omitted) ----- ----- ----- 
Specialist 2619.09**      (467.86) 
2613.92**      
(467.83) 
2656.32**       
(470.68) 
Doctorate 5321.44**      (935.91) 
5389.72**       
(937.38) 
5258.16**       
(950.45) 
Intercept 68,631.30**         (1,337.33) 
67,913.54**    
(1,54.06) 
65,468.37**       
(1,715.44) 
N observations 2570 2570 2538 
R2 0.541 0.542 0.540 
Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and race 
variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year indicator 
variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s degree, Male, Year 
2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at p<0.05; **Significant at 
p<0.01 
  
 Neither a principal’s race nor a principal’s sex appears to impact the level of his 
or her salary. It is important to note that these models do not contain all variables that 
impact the variation in principal salaries. Table 5.7 below is a comparative analysis of the 
extent to which a principal’s demographic characteristics, education, and degree level 
impact his or her salary. With a few exceptions, the findings of the subgroup analyses of 
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the impact of these variables on a principal’s salary are consistent with the findings for 
the complete sample. 
Table 5.7: Relationship between Principal Characteristics and Salary by Subgroup 
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124) 
for Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093) 
Variable 
 Elementary 
School              
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient)  
Middle 
School  
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient)  
High     
School  
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
Combined  
Sample 
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
Experience (years) 
139.20**      
(28.74) 
57.45**      
(0.19) 
267.05**      
(44.36) 
158.31**      
(21.25) 
Female 
1.43        
(525.07) 
-1391.62      
(751.63) 
-1188.02      
(1039.89) 
-710.78      
(405.30) 
Principal Minority (non 
white) 
-1669.04*       
(742.91) 
1009.78       
(1444.80) 
1704.91       
(1680.49) 
-689.18       
(626.16) 
BA 
-5971.00**       
(2249.50) 
-3619.42**       
(2954.22) 
-4473.58       
(2834.48) 
-4742.76*       
(1507.25) 
MA (Omitted) ----- ----- ----- ----- 
Specialist 
2557.18**       
(638.27) 
3995.10**       
(864.41) 
1560.28       
(1094.73) 
2656.32**       
(470.68) 
Doctorate 
6895.68**       
(1338.32) 
4664.68**       
(1478.88) 
3520.93      
(2528.21) 
5258.16**       
(950.45) 
Intercept 
65, 984.14**       
(2,291.14) 
65, 731.23**       
(3,724.04) 
69,819.54**       
(3,266) 
65,468.37**       
(1,715.44) 
N observations 1341 508 697 2538 
R2 0.523 0.620 0.526 0.54 
Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and race 
variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year indicator 
variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s degree, Male, Year 
2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at p<0.05; **Significant at 
p<0.01 
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The Extent to Which Characteristics of Populations Served Impact the Level of Principal 
Pay 
 In this section, I present data on principal pay patterns across districts and schools 
with different levels of enrollment, percent of minority students, and percent of poverty 
students. I also include a description of pay patterns according to district wealth. 
Following this descriptive presentation, I present analysis of the extent to which these 
characteristics of districts and schools impact the level of a principal’s salary, when 
controlling for other related factors. 
District and School Enrollment 
 The data in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show that principals of districts and schools with 
larger enrollments have higher salaries than those in smaller districts and schools. What is 
unclear from these data is whether the larger salaries result specifically from having 
greater enrollments, or if there are other related factors – such as the school level or a 
principal’s degree level – that may be at least in part responsible for these pay patterns. 
 Table 5.8: Average Salary by District Enrollment Quintile from 2005-06 to 2007-08 
District 
Enrollment 
Quintile 
District 
Enrollment 
Quintile 
Min 2007-08 
District 
Enrollment 
Quintile Max 
2007-08 
Salary 05-
06 
(N=869) 
Salary 06-
07 (N=860) 
Salary 07-
08 (N=841) 
1 317 780 $   73,747 $   77,266 $     78,882 
2 781 1,387 $   77,005 $   79,329 $     83,037 
3 1,421 2,895 $   81,378 $   84,549 $     87,000 
4 2,946 8,406 $   86,843 $   91,373 $     95,466 
5 9,002 25,738 $   95,213 $   98,381 $   100,837 
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Table 5.9: Average Salary by School Enrollment Quintile from 2005-06 to 2007-08 
School  
Enrollment 
Quintile 
School 
Enrollment 
Quintile 
Min 2007-
08 
School 
Enrollment 
Quintile 
Max 2007-
08 
Salary 05-
06 
(N=869) 
Salary 06-
07 
(N=860) 
Salary 07-
08 
(N=841) 
1 0 247 $73,780  $77,234  $79,916  
2 249 345 $79,541  $82,845  $84,055  
3 346 448 $82,057  $84,485  $88,370  
4 449 607 $85,861  $88,907  $93,073  
5 609 3135 $93,134  $97,342  $99,980  
 
 
The analysis in Table 5.10 below suggests that district and school enrollments do 
have a significant impact on principal salaries, when holding constant other factors 
related to the variation in principal pay. Specifically, principals can expect to earn 
approximately one dollar more in salary for each student enrolled in the district and 
approximately fourteen dollars more in salary for each student enrolled in his or her 
school. 
Table 5.10: Excerpt from Regression Table for Question One – The 
Extent to Which District and School Enrollment Impact Differences 
in the Level of Principal Pay 
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124) 
For Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093) 
Variable 
Model 1                
(No 
Performance 
Data) 
Model 
2    
(AYP 
Data) 
Model 3 (Percent 
Proficient) 
District Enrollment .80**                  (.04) 
.80**      
(.04) 
.80** 
(.04) 
School Enrollment 14.11**               (0.75) 
14.25**      
(.76) 
14.01** 
(.76) 
Intercept 68,631.30**         (1,337.33) 
67,913.54**    
(1,54.06) 
65,468.37**       
(1,715.44) 
N observations 2570 2570 2538 
R2 0.541 0.542 0.540 
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Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, 
size, wealth, and race variables; principal degree level, experience, 
race, and sex variables; year indicator variables and performance 
variables. Omitted variables are Master’s degree, Male, Year 2005-
06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at p<0.05; 
**Significant at p<0.01 
 
The coefficients, presented in the subgroup analysis of Table 5.11 below, regarding the 
impact of district and school enrollments, are consistent with those of the combined 
sample. 
Table 5.11: Excerpt from Regression Table for Question One – The Extent to Which 
District and School Enrollment Impact Differences in the Level of Principal Pay by 
Subgroup 
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124) 
for Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093) 
Variable 
 Elementary 
School              
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient)  
Middle 
School  
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient)  
High     
School  
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
Combined  
Sample 
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
District Enrollment 
.74**           
(.06) 
.82**          
(.10) 
.76**          
(.13) 
.80**           
(.04) 
School Enrollment 
13.01**         
(.76) 
17.18**      
(2.11) 
14.61**      
(1.40) 
14.01**      
(.76) 
Intercept 
65, 984.14**       
(2,291.14) 
65, 731.23**       
(3,724.04) 
69,819.54**       
(3,266) 
65,468.37**       
(1,715.44) 
N observations 1341 508 697 2538 
R2 0.523 0.620 0.526 0.54 
Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and race 
variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year indicator 
variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s degree, Male, Year 
2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at p<0.05; **Significant at 
p<0.01 
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District and School Percent Minority 
 
The data in Tables 5.12 and 5.13 show that principals of districts and schools with 
larger percentages of minority students enrolled generally have higher salaries than those 
in districts and schools smaller percentages of minority students enrolled. Again, it is 
unclear from these data whether these larger salaries result specifically from having 
greater minority enrollments, or if there are other related factors – such as the school 
level or a principal’s degree level – that may be at least in part responsible. 
 
Table 5.12: Average Salary by District Percent Minority Quintile from 2005-06 to 2007-
08 
District 
Percent  
Minority 
Quintile 
District 
Percent 
Minority 
Quintile Min 
2007-08 
District 
Percent 
Minority 
Quintile Max 
2007-08 
Salary 05-
06 
(N=869) 
Salary 
06-07 
(N=860) 
Salary 
07-08 
(N=841) 
1 1 4  $  77,072   $  80,324   $  83,485  
2 4 13  $  80,223   $  82,890   $  85,638  
3 13 33  $  83,172   $  86,731   $  90,490  
4 33 50  $  88,584   $  91,279   $  93,218  
5 50 97  $  85,266   $  89,511   $  92,523  
 
 
Table 5.13: Average Salary by School Percent Minority Quintile from 2005-06 to 2007-
08 
School 
Percent 
Minority 
Quintile 
School 
Percent 
Minority 
Quintile Min 
2007-08 
School 
Percent 
Minority 
Quintile Max 
2007-08 
Salary 
05-06 
(N=869) 
Salary 
06-07 
(N=860) 
Salary 
07-08 
(N=841) 
1 0% 4% $77,159  $80,637  $83,359  
2 4% 11% $80,349  $83,150  $85,539  
3 11% 31% $84,579  $86,584  $91,036  
4 31% 55% $85,725  $90,316  $92,557  
5 55% 100% $86,561  $86,157  $92,792  
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The analysis in Table 5.14 below is consistent with the patterns above and 
suggests that district minority enrollment percentages do have a significant, positive 
impact on principal salaries, when holding constant other factors related to the variation 
in principal pay. Specifically, for each percentage point increase in minority enrollment at 
the district level, principals earn an additional 60 dollars per year.  School minority 
percent is, however, not a significant predictor.  
Table 5.14: Excerpt from Regression Table for Question One – The Extent to Which 
District and School Minority Enrollment Percentages Impact Differences in the Level of 
Principal Pay 
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124) 
For Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093) 
Variable 
 Model 1                
(No Performance 
Data)  
Model 2    
(AYP Data) 
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
District_Minority% 58.38*            (26.95) 
58.79*     
(26.95) 
65.60*         
(27.27) 
School_Minority% -7.06             (24.84) 
-4.27       
(24.94) 
-2.03        
(25.37) 
Intercept 68,631.30**         (1,337.33) 
67,913.54**    
(1,54.06) 
65,468.37**       
(1,715.44) 
N observations 2570 2570 2538 
R2 0.541 0.542 0.540 
Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and 
race variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year 
indicator variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s 
degree, Male, Year 2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at 
p<0.05; **Significant at p<0.01 
 
 
 
 The coefficients, presented in the subgroup analysis of Table 5.15 below, 
regarding the impact of district and school enrollments on principal pay, are not 
consistent with those of the combined sample. Specifically, district percent minority is no 
longer a significant predictor of variation in principal salary, when the combined sample 
is disaggregated by school level.  
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Table 5.15: Excerpt from Regression Table for Question One – The Extent to Which 
District and School Minority Enrollment Percentages Impact Differences in the Level of 
Principal Pay by Subgroup 
 
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124) 
for Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093) 
Variable 
 Elementary 
School              
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient)  
Middle 
School  
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient)  
High     
School  
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
Combined  
Sample 
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
District_Minority% 
46.22         
(30.45) 
88.62         
(81.82) 
-39.67        
(96.36) 
65.60*         
(27.27) 
School_Minority% 
7.87         
(27.53) 
7.12         
(80.60) 
86.91         
(92.74) 
-2.03        
(25.37) 
Intercept 
65, 984.14**       
(2,291.14) 
65, 731.23**       
(3,724.04) 
69,819.54**       
(3,266) 
65,468.37**       
(1,715.44) 
N observations 1341 508 697 2538 
R2 0.523 0.620 0.526 0.54 
Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and race 
variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year indicator 
variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s degree, Male, Year 
2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at p<0.05; **Significant at 
p<0.01 
 
District and School Poverty 
The data in Table 5.16 show that principals in wealthier districts – i.e. those that 
have larger income per pupil related to that district’s local tax base – are generally better 
paid than principals in lower wealth districts. Further, the data in Tables 5.17 and 5.18 
show that principals of districts and schools with larger percentages of poverty students 
enrolled generally have lower salaries than those in districts and schools smaller 
percentages of poverty students enrolled. Again, it is unclear from these data whether the 
smaller salaries result specifically from having higher percentages of poverty students, or 
if there are other related factors that may be at least in part responsible for these patterns.  
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Table 5.16: Average Salary by District Wealth Index Quintile from 2005-06 to 2007-08 
District 
Wealth 
Index 
Quintile 
District Wealth 
Index Quintile 
Min 2007-08 
District Wealth 
Index Quintile 
Max 2007-08 
Salary 
05-06 
(N=869) 
Salary 
06-07 
(N=860) 
Salary 
07-08 
(N=841) 
1 0.14 0.37 $78,946  $82,702  $85,621  
2 0.37 0.46 $77,899  $81,613  $83,992  
3 0.47 0.61 $79,437  $83,052  $85,848  
4 0.61 0.83 $84,325  $86,684  $91,833  
5 0.86 1 $93,748  $96,669  $98,043  
 
Table 5.17: Average Salary by District Percent FRL Quintile from 2005-06 to 2007-08 
District 
Percent 
FRL 
Quintile 
District 
Percent FRL 
Quintile Min 
2007-08 
District 
Percent FRL 
Quintile Max 
2007-08 
Salary 
05-06 
(N=869) 
Salary 
06-07 
(N=860) 
Salary 
07-08 
(N=841) 
1 16 45 $85,719  $88,677  $93,520  
2 46 53 $87,819  $88,104  $88,729  
3 53 60 $78,917  $83,451  $90,719  
4 60 70 $84,502  $88,428  $87,659  
5 70 100 $77,360  $81,927  $84,782  
 
Table 5.18: Average Salary by School Percent FRL Quintile from 2005-06 to 2007-08 
School 
Percent 
FRL 
Quintile 
School 
Percent FRL 
Quintile Min 
2007-08 
School 
Percent FRL 
Quintile Max 
2007-08 
Salary 
05-06 
(N=869) 
Salary 
06-07 
(N=860) 
Salary 
07-08 
(N=841) 
1 0% 41% $87,936  $91,503  $96,322  
2 41% 51% $85,353  $86,136  $89,199  
3 52% 62% $80,984  $85,098  $86,388  
4 62% 73% $78,821  $82,802  $85,667  
5 74% 100% $81,341  $85,262  $87,735  
 
The analysis in Table 5.19 below suggests that district wealth has a positive, 
significant impact on principal pay and that district percentages of poverty students have 
a significant, negative impact on principal salaries. Specifically, for each percentage point 
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increase in district percent poverty enrollment, principals earn over 85 dollars less per 
year.  However, school percentages of poverty students do not tend to have a significant 
impact on principal salaries, when holding constant other factors related to the variation 
in principal pay.  
Table 5.19: Excerpt from Regression Table for Question One – The Extent to 
Which District and School Percent Poverty and District Wealth Impact Differences 
in the Level of Principal Pay 
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124) 
For Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093) 
Variable 
Model 1                
(No Performance 
Data) 
Model 2    
(AYP Data) 
Model 3 (Percent 
Proficient) 
District _FRL% -83.31*            (28.03) 
-82.97*      
(28.03) 
-92.16**        
(28.34) 
School_FRL% -3.97                 (23.42) 
-2.82          
(23.43) 
13.44            
(24.05) 
District_Wealth 26.78* (10.56) 
26.34*   
(10.57) 
24.53* 
(10.63) 
Intercept 68,631.30**         (1,337.33) 
67,913.54**    
(1,54.06) 
65,468.37**       
(1,715.44) 
N observations 2570 2570 2538 
R2 0.541 0.542 0.540 
Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and 
race variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year 
indicator variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s 
degree, Male, Year 2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at 
p<0.05; **Significant at p<0.01 
 
 
                The coefficients, presented in the subgroup analysis of Table 5.20 below 
– regarding the impact of district and school percentages of poverty students and 
the influence of a district’s wealth on principal pay – are only partially consistent 
with those of the combined sample. In particular, the district wealth index variable 
only retains significance in the elementary principal sample and district FRL is not 
significant in the high school sample analysis.  
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Table 5.20: Excerpt from Regression Table for Question One – The Extent 
to Which District and School Percent Poverty and District Wealth Impact 
Differences in the Level of Principal Pay by Subgroup 
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124) 
for Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093) 
Variable 
 Elementary 
School              
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient)  
Middle 
School  
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient)  
High     
School  
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
Combined  
Sample 
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
District _FRL% 
 -77.95*            
(28.03)  
-152.38**        
(32.61) 
-32.35       
(82.46) 
-92.16**        
(28.34) 
School_FRL% 
 -25.60                 
(26.20)  
92.02       
(76.65) 
-54.61       
(69.35) 
13.44       
(24.05) 
District_Wealth 
58.35**    
(14.68) 
.63       
(21.27) 
-25.27      
(21.78) 
24.53*    
(10.63) 
Intercept 
65, 984**       
(2,291.14) 
65, 731.23**       
(3,724.04) 
69,819.54**       
(3,266) 
65,468.37**       
(1,715.44) 
N observations 1341 508 697 2538 
R2 0.523 0.620 0.526 0.54 
Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and 
race variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year 
indicator variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s 
degree, Male, Year 2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at 
p<0.05; **Significant at p<0.01 
 
 
School Level 
The data in Table 5.21 show that principals of high schools earn more than 
principals of elementary schools, but that principals of middle schools earn more than 
principals of high schools. It is unclear from these data whether there is in fact a higher 
salary return for working in a middle school, or if there are other related factors that may 
be at least in part responsible for these patterns.   
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Table 5.21: Average Principal Salaries by School Level from 2005-06 to 2007-08 
School 
Level 
N       
2005-
06 
 Avg 
Salary 
2005-06  
N       
2006-
07 
 Avg 
Salary 
2006-07  
N       
2007
-08 
 Avg 
Salary 
2007-
08  
Total 
N 
 Avg 
Overall  
Elementary 453 $81,288  455 $84,568  434 $87,350  1342 $84,361  
Middle 163 $86,416  175 $89,553  174 $92,252  512 $89,472  
High 253 $83,456  230 $86,717  234 $89,847  717 $86,588  
Total 869 $82,881  860 $86,157  841 $89,059  2570 $85,999  
  
The data in Table 5.22 below indicate that principals of middle schools and high 
schools both earn higher salaries relative to their elementary school colleagues, holding 
all things constant. However, contrary to the patterns revealed in table 5.20 above, middle 
school principals are not paid more than high school principals due to school level, when 
holding constant other factors that might influence principal pay. 
Table 5.22: Excerpt from Regression Table for Question One – The Extent to 
Which School Level Impacts Differences in the Level of Principal Pay 
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124) 
For Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093) 
Variable 
Model 1                
(No Performance 
Data) 
Model 2      
(AYP Data) 
Model 3  
(Percent 
Proficient) 
Elementary School (Omitted) ----- ----- ----- 
Middle School 3575.33**     (496.51) 
3668.60**    
(501.97) 
4016.51**       
(514.21) 
High School 4253.74**    (534.57) 
4308.74**    
(536.31) 
4950.29**       
(583.76) 
Intercept 68,631.30**         (1,337.33) 
67,913.54**    
(1,54.06) 
65,468.37**       
(1,715.44) 
N observations 2570 2570 2538 
R2 0.541 0.542 0.540 
Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and 
race variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year 
indicator variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s 
degree, Male, Year 2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at 
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p<0.05; **Significant at p<0.01 
 
  
The Extent to Which a Principal’s Prior Performance Impacts the Level of Pay 
 In this section, I present an excerpt from the question one regression analysis that 
focuses on the extent to which a principal’s performance in a previous year impacts the 
level of his or her salary in the subsequent year, while holding constant other observable 
factors that influence the level of a principal’s pay. 
Table 5.23 below is a comparison of principals who were in schools that met AYP 
in the prior year as opposed to those who were in schools that failed AYP in the prior 
year. At the elementary school level, there is virtually no difference between the salaries 
of those who met and those who failed AYP. At the middle and high school levels, 
principals who met AYP in the prior year were actually lower paid on average than 
principals who failed AYP. This pattern could reflect a number of possibilities, including 
the potential that smaller schools or districts were more likely to meet AYP or that high 
minority districts were less likely to meet AYP.  It is also noteworthy that the experience 
levels – which do impact pay – are also virtually the same between the two groups of 
principals at the middle and high school levels.  
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Table 5.23: Characteristics of Principals who Failed AYP in Time t-1  
vs. Principals who Met AYP in Time t-1 from 2004-05 to 2007-08 
School Level Elem Middle High Total 
N Principals (Met AYP) 1409 389 696 2494 
N Principals (Failed  AYP) 280 207 210 697 
Average Salary (Met AYP) $76,379  $78,916  $76,337  $76,765  
Average Salary (Failed AYP) $76,130  $85,421  $84,091  $81,289  
Average Experience (Met AYP) 22.7 21.9 21.3 22.2 
Average Experience (Failed AYP) 23.4 21.1 22.5 22.4 
Percent Female (Met AYP) 68% 34% 16% 48% 
Percent Female (Failed AYP) 70% 44% 22% 48% 
 
 
Table 5.24 below presents the extent to which the level of performance of a 
principal in a prior year impacts the level of his or her salary. In Model 1, no performance 
data are included. When including AYP data in Model 2 – i.e. whether a principal served 
in a school that met AYP in the prior year – the predictive power of the model is not 
appreciably larger. Moreover, according to the data in Table 5.24, whether or not a 
principal met AYP in the prior year does not have a significant impact on the level of his 
or her salary. Therefore, it can be said that the differences in the salaries observed at the 
middle and high school levels in Table 5.23 above not influenced by a principal’s 
performance, as measured by AYP.  
Table 5.24: The Extent to which Prior Performance of a Principal Impacts the Level of 
Principal Pay 
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124) 
for Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093) 
Variable 
 Model 1                
(No 
Performance 
Data)  
Model 2 
(AYP Data) 
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
Meets_AYP ----- 606.54       (482.66) ----- 
Average % proficient time t-1 ----- ----- 44.78*      (15.42) 
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Intercept 68,631.30**         (1,337.33) 
67,913.54**    
(1,54.06) 
65,468.37**       
(1,715.44) 
N observations 2570 2570 2538 
R2 0.541 0.542 0.540 
Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and race 
variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year indicator 
variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s degree, Male, Year 
2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at p<0.05; **Significant at 
p<0.01 
 
In Model 3, however, which includes a different performance variable – the 
average percent proficient of the students on the state academic assessment in the school 
where the principal served in the prior year – performance is a statistically significant 
predictor of variation in the level of a principal’s salary, holding all other factors 
constant.  It is worth noting that this performance variable, though statistically 
significant, does not appear to have a particularly large impact on the level of salary in 
terms of actual dollars.  Increasing the percent proficient by one standard deviation – a 
relatively large increase (approximately a 17 percentage point increase in percent 
proficient is required to move from the 50th percentile to the 84th
The subgroup analysis by school level on the impact of a principal’s performance, 
as measured by percent proficient on principal salary levels, is generally consistent with 
the findings above. It is noteworthy that the coefficient on performance is much larger at 
 percentile of the percent 
proficient performance distribution, or literally moving from the mean of 55 percent 
proficient to 72 percent proficient) – would result in a salary increase of about 0.03 
standard deviations – about $760, or not even 1 percent of the average principal salary 
during this time period. Additionally, it is noteworthy that including this variable in the 
model does not improve its explanatory power. 
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the middle school level than at the elementary level and not at significant at the high 
school level. These positive coefficients are still not particularly large, however. 
Table 5.25: The Extent to which Prior Performance of a Principal Impacts the Level 
of Principal Pay by Subgroup 
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $85,999; SD $13,124) 
for Model 3 (M $86,000; SD $13,093) 
Variable 
 Elementary 
School              
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient)  
Middle 
School  Model 
3 (Percent 
Proficient)  
High     
School  
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
Combined  
Sample 
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
Average % proficient time 
t-1 
45.37*      
(19.49) 
109.71**      
(40.23) 
8.48      
(34.34) 
44.78*      
(15.42) 
Intercept 
65, 984.14**       
(2,291.14) 
65, 731.23**       
(3,724.04) 
69,819.54**       
(3,266) 
65,468.37**       
(1,715.44) 
N observations 1341 508 697 2538 
R2 0.523 0.620 0.526 0.54 
Independent variables included: School and district level poverty, size, wealth, and race 
variables; principal degree level, experience, race, and sex variables; year indicator 
variables and performance variables. Omitted variables are Master’s degree, Male, Year 
2005-06, Fails AYP, Principal non-minority. *Significant at p<0.05; **Significant at 
p<0.01 
 
Characteristics and Effectiveness of Principals Who Leave the Profession  
The data in Table 5.26 below show that, across school levels, principals who 
leave the profession tend to have roughly the same characteristics as those who stay in 
the profession. Further, there is virtually no difference between the performance of those 
who leave and those who remain in the profession.  
 
 
 
 
 
101 
 
Table 5.26: Comparisons between Principals who Stay in the Data Set and Those 
who Leave from 2005-06 to 2006-07 
School Level Elem Middle High Total 
N Leavers 186 78 162 426 
N Stayers 1503 518 744 2765 
Average Salary Leavers T-1 $74,384  $79,415  $79,162  $77,083  
Average Salary Stayers T-1 $76,580  $81,435  $77,938  $77,859  
Average Experience Leavers T-1 24.2 23.2 24.1 24 
Average Experience Stayers T-1 22.6 21.4 21 22 
Percent of Leavers Who Are Female 68% 27% 21% 42% 
Percent of Stayers Who are Female 68% 39% 17% 49% 
Percent of Leavers Who Meet AYP 84% 68% 79% 79% 
Percent of Stayers Who Meet AYP 83% 65% 76% 78% 
Average Percent Proficient of Leavers 57% 49% 48% 52% 
Average Percent Proficient of Stayers 59% 53% 49% 55% 
 
 The data in Table 5.27 below show that there is a difference in the turnover rates 
of principals – defined as one minus the ratio of principals who remain in the same 
position in the same school year over year – based on performance. In this analysis 
principals were grouped as high- (principals in the top third in percent proficient), 
medium- (principals in the middle third in percent proficient), and low-performing 
(principals in the bottom third in percent proficient).   
 Table 5.27: Turnover Rate for Group of Principals by Performance Category 
  Principal Performance Category 
Year 
Low 
Performing 
Medium 
Performing 
High 
Performing 
2004-05 to 2005-06 27.2% 21.6% 21.3% 
2005-06 to 2006-07 32.5% 18.0% 19.9% 
2006-07 to 2007-08  23.4% 17.1% 16.3% 
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These data indicate that there is greater turnover among principals at low-performing 
schools than at medium- or high-performing schools. There is not an appreciable 
difference between turnover at medium- and high-performing schools. 
Summary of Question One Findings 
 In sum for question one, I find that the following are significant predictors of the 
variation in a principal’s salary: 
• a principal’s experience (positive) and degree level (positive), but not his or her 
sex or race; 
• the school level at which a principal serves, where high school principals are paid 
more than middle school principals, who are in turn paid more than elementary 
principals; 
• district factors, including district size (positive), district wealth (positive), district 
percent of poverty students enrolled (negative), and district percent of minority 
students (negative) enrolled, for combined sample only; 
• school size (positive), but not a school’s percent of poverty students enrolled, nor 
a school’s percent of minority students enrolled; 
• the year (positive) in which a principal is employed; 
• performance (positive) when reported as percent proficient, but not when given as 
meeting AYP. 
Subgroup analyses of the impacts of the included variables on principal salary by school 
level largely confirm the findings for the combined sample. The most noteworthy 
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difference was the district percent minority is not significant in any of the subgroup 
samples, in contrast to the finding for district percent minority for the combined sample. 
Of these variables, the largest determinants are: school level, degree level, and year. 
District and school variables that were significant have a very small impact on salary 
variation.   
Findings of Research Question Two: Factors Influencing Changes in Principal Pay 
 Research question two focuses on the extent to which a principal’s performance 
impacts the magnitude of the change in his or her principal’s salary. That is, I am 
investigating whether a principal’s performance in time t-1 impacts the magnitude of the 
principal’s salary increase between time t and time t-1. The findings of this question 
combined with those of question one above give insight into the presence of performance 
incentives that may already exist in the principal labor market.  
The district and school factors – e.g. size and poverty status – that impact the 
level of a principal’s pay are intentionally excluded from this analysis. Not controlling for 
these sources of variation in the level of principal pay allows the model to measure the 
effects of, for example having highly successful principals to move from less lucrative 
positions to better paying principalships in larger schools or districts. Experience is 
excluded from the models in question two because all principals in the analysis will be 
seen to gain a one-year change in experience; this average gain will be captured in the 
year dummy variable. Further, a principal’s own time invariant characteristics (race and 
sex) are excluded. The change in level of degree, however, is included, as a principal can 
increase his or her degree level from year to year.  
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Table 5.28: Regression Coefficients for Question Two – The Relationship between School 
Performance and the Change in Principal Pay from 2005-06 to 2007-08 
Model 1 Dependent Variable: Salary in Time t (M=86,057; SD=13,114) 
Model 2 Dependent Variable: Salary in Time t (M=$86,058; SD=13,083) 
Variable 
Model 1              
(AYP) 
Model 2        
(Percent Proficient) 
Meets_AYP -289.61         (312.23) ----- 
Percent Proficient Plus ----- -130.23         (799.64) 
Salary t-1 .79**                  (.01) 
.79**                  
(.01) 
Earned Specialist Degree 681.17         (1220.58) 
623.40         
(1244.69) 
Earned Doctorate Degree 6,455.45**         (2924.08) 
6,423.56**    
(2931.53) 
Year 2006-07 -6,753.51**       (337.00) 
-6,715.51**     
(344.33) 
Year 2007-08 -6,912.86**      (351.62) 
-6,869.99**   
(365.68) 
Intercept 28,844.49**     (745.61) 
28,771.98**    
(798.41) 
N Observations 2550 2518 
R2 0.753 0.751 
*Significant at p<0.05; **Significant at p<0.01 
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 The findings in Table 5.28 suggest that a principal’s performance – as measured 
by meeting AYP or by the percent of students scoring proficient or better on state 
achievement tests – is not a significant predictor of change in his or her salary year to 
year. Those principals who earn doctorate degrees do, however, receive a rather large 
increase on average. It is also interesting to note that the change in salary from 2005-06 
to 2006-07 was on average much larger than the change in salary over the successive two 
years. This large average change in salary in the first year of the analysis may have been 
due to infusions of money into the education system that resulted from the Lake View 
decision. 
Chapter Five Summary 
The findings of the analysis presented above can best be summarized by 
addressing the study’s research hypotheses.  
 Research Hypothesis 1a:  The findings above confirm that principals of high 
schools and middle schools can expect to earn higher salaries than those in elementary 
schools and that principals of high schools earn more than those in middle schools, when 
holding constant the other factors that influence the variation in principal pay. The fact 
that pay patterns by school level show that Arkansas middle school principals earn more 
than high school principals is not related to school level, but to other characteristics of 
those principals.  
 Research Hypothesis 1b: The findings above confirm that school enrollment is a 
significant, positive determinant of principal pay both at the district and school level, 
holding all else constant.  
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 Research Hypothesis 1c: The findings above confirm that principals in lower 
income districts and in schools that serve poorer students earn less than principals in 
wealthier districts and schools that serve fewer poor students, holding all else constant. 
 Research Hypothesis 1d: The findings above do not confirm that principals in 
districts with higher minority student populations are significantly better paid than those 
in districts with lower percentages of minority students, all else equal. Although the 
combined analysis confirmed the positive impact of increased minority enrollment at the 
district level on salary, the subgroup analysis failed to reinforce this finding. 
 Research Hypothesis 1e: The findings above confirm that principals with 
advanced degrees (specialist, doctorate, etc.) and more experience (years on the job) earn 
more than those with lower level degrees and less experience, holding all else constant.   
As anticipated, the higher the level of a principal’s educational attainment, the higher the 
salary he or she earns, all else equal.  
 Research Hypothesis 1f: The findings above show that neither principal race nor 
principal sex is a significant predictor of principal pay.  
Research Hypothesis 1g: The findings above largely fail to support the hypothesis 
that principal pay increases as principals are more successful, as measured by their 
performance in the prior year, when holding all else constant.  When principal 
performance in the prior year is measured by whether his or her school met AYP in the 
prior year, principal pay is not affected. There is a significant effect on pay of the percent 
proficient in the prior year, however, when performance is measured by the percent 
proficient or better on the state assessments of the principal’s school in the prior year. 
The subgroup analyses indicate that more successful principals, as measured by the 
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percent proficient variable, earn higher salaries as a result in elementary and middle 
schools, but not in high schools.  It is important to note that these statistically significant 
finding are practically unimportant. For the combined sample, increasing the percent 
proficient by one standard deviation results in an increase of 0.06 standard deviations in 
salary. Additionally, it is noteworthy that including either performance variable in the 
model does not improve its explanatory power. 
 Research Hypothesis 2: The findings above fail to support the hypothesis that 
principals who perform better in the prior year (meet AYP or have higher percent 
proficient) earn greater salary increases year-over-year.  
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
Pay Incentives in the Existing Principal Labor Market  
 This study was designed to investigate the nature of pay incentives in the existing 
principal labor market. Specifically, I was investigating if principals who perform better 
earn higher salaries and if better principals are differentially rewarded with larger pay 
raises – either by earning performance pay awards or by moving to higher paying jobs. In 
exploring these questions, I also investigated the extent to which a principal’s own 
characteristics, such as a principal’s race, degree level, and experience, might impact both 
the level of pay and the magnitude of change in pay. At the same time, I attempted to 
gauge the extent to which the characteristics of the populations served, with respect to a 
district or school’s racial makeup, poverty status, size, or level, might impact both the 
level of a principal’s pay and also the size of changes in a principal’s pay.  
Alongside these analyses, I examined patterns of principal pay with respect to 
enrollments, racial composition, or poverty levels, without holding constant related 
factors. The purpose of presenting these descriptive findings in comparison to the 
findings of the regression analyses was to determine whether any apparent patterns of 
principal pay may be reflecting principals’ own characteristics or performance, rather 
than the characteristics of the populations served.  For example, I investigated whether 
principals serving districts with higher poverty rates tended to be paid less because, in 
fact, those districts might not be able to pay higher salaries, or because, for example, 
poorer districts might not be able to attract mostly experienced principals. The findings in 
the regression analyses provided insight into this type of question by showing, on 
average, whether any variation in principal pay was due to the poverty level of the 
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district, and if so, the extent of that negative impact. The comparison of the descriptive 
patterns of principal pay across districts with varying levels of percent poverty to the 
findings in the regression analysis, in which district percent poverty was an included 
variable, did not in itself fully resolve the question of whether poorer districts pay less or 
have inexperienced principals. However, the findings of the regression analysis do 
suggest, in the current case at least, that principals, regardless of their experience, tend to 
earn less in higher poverty districts.   
Impact of Principal’s Performance on Pay 
 A principal’s performance has little to no impact on his or her pay. Those 
principals who met AYP in the prior year neither earned a higher salary nor earned a 
larger raise in salary than principals who led schools that failed AYP. This finding 
suggests either that performance has no impact on pay, or that meeting or failing AYP is 
simply an irrelevant measure of principal performance to those who monitor a principal’s 
work. 
 When including a continuous (and better) measure of principal performance – the 
percent of students in a principal’s school in the prior year who performed proficient or 
better on the state’s standardized achievement test – I did find a positive, significant 
impact on principal pay. However, even when the performance variable was statistically 
significant, its impact on the variation in principal pay was extremely small. A very large 
one standard deviation increase in percent proficient resulted in a less than 1 percent 
increase in principal pay. Interestingly, the subgroup analyses indicated that more 
successful principals, as measured by the percent proficient variable, earn higher salaries 
in elementary and middle schools, but not in high schools. One of the reasons for 
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conducting the subgroup analysis by school level was to unpack how the differences in 
school performance by school level might be related to differences in pay. It is the case 
that elementary schools tend to have higher levels of percent proficient, as there is a 
greater variance in student performance as students progress through school. Nonetheless, 
there is not a obvious explanation for why performance might be differentially rewarded 
at one school level rather than the other. 
Impact of a Principal’s Characteristics on Pay 
 The findings in this study suggest that principals wishing to increase their pay 
would do better to expend extra effort earning an advanced degree after school hours, 
than to expend any additional effort on raising student performance during the day.  On 
average, principals with specialist’s degrees earn three percent more than those with 
master’s degrees, and principals with doctorate degrees earn over six percent more than 
those with master’s degrees, all else equal. Moreover, in the year after that the doctorate 
degree is earned, principals can expect to see a large, statistically significant pay increase 
of approximately seven percent. Fortunately, from the perspective of pay equity, a 
principal’s race and sex are unrelated to his or her level of pay.  
Impact of the Characteristics of Population Served on Principal Pay 
 All else equal, principals wishing to increase their salaries should seek to work in 
middle or high schools instead of in elementary schools. The difference between the 
average middle and high school salary is not particularly large as a percent of total 
average salary. But on average, principals of middle schools earn over four percent more 
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than elementary principals, and principals of high schools earn over five percent more 
than elementary principals, all else equal. 
 The findings in this study related to school and district enrollment demographic 
characteristics and enrollment size suggest that variation in principal pay among districts 
is greater than principal pay variation within districts. Of the included school 
characteristics, only school enrollment was a significant predictor of the variation in 
principal pay. For the combined sample, all district level variables were significant 
predictors of principal pay, but the subgroup analysis failed to reinforce the finding that 
high minority districts pay better salaries.  
 Despite my original inability to identify a policy that might account for the  
hypothesis that principals in high minority districts would earn better pay, I did in fact 
predict that increases district minority would be associated with higher principal pay 
because of the findings in Barnett, Ritter, and Riffel (2008) regarding pay patterns for 
Arkansas teachers. In a purely descriptive analysis, Barnett, Ritter, and Riffel (2008) had 
found that teachers in high minority districts were better paid than those in low minority 
districts. So, I assumed that these patterns would be duplicated at the principal level. 
Before running the subgroup analyses, I did nonetheless seek to determine if there could 
be a policy-relevant explanation for my findings regarding the combined sample.      
 Because there was not a policy relevant explanation for the combined sample 
finding that high minority districts would pay principals better than low minority 
districts, all else equal, I re-ran the regression analyses and included a dummy variable 
for the three districts that have received significant state desegregation aid since the late 
1980’s. Little Rock School District, North Little Rock School District, and Pulaski 
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County Special School District together receive approximately $70 million annually from 
the state (Howell, 2008). Including this dummy variable for districts that receive 
desegregation money did not, however, provide more clarity or appreciably change the 
coefficient on minority or its significance. The explanation for this combined sample 
finding may be contained in the error term.  Fortunately, given the fact that the only 
apparent policy explanation for the significant positive combined sample finding on 
district percent minority turned out to be untenable, the subgroup analyses did provide 
some clarity that a district’s minority percentage are rather unlikely, after all, to be a 
significant predictor of variation in principal pay.   
Findings in Context of Existing Related Literature  
 
As noted in the introductory chapters, little research has been performed on 
principal compensation systems and the viability of performance pay programs for these 
school leaders (Goldhaber, 2007). Two studies (Cullen and Mazzeo, 2007) and 
Goldhaber (2007) directly explore the factors that are responsible for the variation in 
principal salaries. In his study of national data, which were pulled three times over a ten-
year period from 1993-94 to 2003-04, Goldhaber (2007) attempted to uncover the 
specific district and school level factors that impact principal pay. He did not use a direct 
performance variable, but inferred that the lower amount of variance explained by 
observed variables included in his models, relative to the amount that can be explained in 
similar models of teacher pay, may include some aspect of performance pay. Cullen and 
Mazzeo (2007) explored principal labor market data in Texas from 1989-2006. Although 
they did include information about the relative impact of control variables, Cullen and 
Mazzeo (2007) provided direct – as opposed to inferred – evidence that more effective 
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principals are rewarded with higher salaries.  Table 6.1 below summarizes key features of 
the current study with relation to these prior studies.  
Table 6.1: Comparison of Current Study Findings to those in Existing Principal 
Compensation Literature 
  
Current 
Study 
(2009) 
Goldhaber 
(2007) 
Cullen and Mazzeo 
(2007) 
Study Location Arkansas National Data Set Texas 
Time Frame of Total  
Study Sample 3 years 
3 data pulls 
over 10 year 
period 
16 years 
Dates for Analysis Sample 2005-2008 1993-94, 1999-00, 2003-04 1989-2005 
N 2,570 9,098 14,723 
Range of Explained 
Variance All Models 0.540-0.750 0.44-0.46 Not Reported 
Principal Race NS S/NS Unclear 
Principal Sex NS S/NS Unclear 
Principal Experience S S Unclear 
Advanced Degree S S Unclear 
Prior Teaching/Admin 
Experience 
Not 
Included S Unclear 
School Enrollment S S/NS Unclear 
School Race NS S/NS Included/Not Reported 
School Percent Poverty NS S/NS Included/Not Reported 
School Percent LEP Not Included Not Included 
Included/Not 
Reported 
District Enrollment S S/NS Included/Not Reported 
District Race S Not Included Included/Not Reported 
District Percent Poverty S Not Included Included/Not Reported 
District Wealth Variable S Not Included Included/Not Reported 
Urbanicity Not Included S 
Included/Not 
Reported 
Region of Country Not Relevant S Not Relevant 
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School Level S S Included/Not Reported 
Pupil-Teacher Ratio Not Included S/NS Not Included 
Performance Variable S/NS Not Included S 
 
The information in Table 6.1 above indicates that the current study’s findings are 
largely consistent with those of Goldhaber (2007). In particular, in both studies, 
principals of secondary schools earn higher salaries than those in elementary schools, and 
principals in larger and wealthier districts earn higher salaries. In addition, principals with 
more experience and with advanced degrees are better paid in both studies. Moreover, 
school and district size are significant, positive predictors of principal pay in both studies.  
 The most useful comparison to Cullen and Mazzeo (2007) involves the principal 
performance variable. In analyzing the career paths of full-time principals, they found 
that principals of the highest performing schools experienced greater increases in wages 
than did principals of low performing schools when moving to new positions. Moreover, 
when examining the wage changes for principals who remained at their current jobs, they 
found that principals of the highest performing schools similarly experienced greater 
wage growth than did principals of low performing schools.   
 In the current study, I only found performance to be a significant, positive 
predictor of principal pay in the models that included the percent proficient variable of 
for principal performance. And, the impact of this variable on salary was very small. 
Further, my findings regarding implicit rewards – i.e. the notion that high performing 
principals find a way to sort themselves into higher pay principalships – do not indicate 
that such a system is operating in the Arkansas principal labor market.  By contrast, 
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Cullen and Mazzeo (2007) argue that their findings provide evidence of implicit rewards 
in the Texas principal labor market related to higher performance. In addition to the 
likely presence of implicit financial rewards in the Texas principal labor market, key 
policy differences between Arkansas and Texas that have impacted principal pay may 
also contribute to the difference in findings between these studies. As described in 
Chapter One, performance pay programs for educators in Texas have surfaced across 
districts in Texas over the last two decades (Lewis and Springer, 2008). 
 One other existing study of the relationship between principal performance and 
rewards in the labor market in Texas (Ladd, 1999) has relevance for contextualizing the 
current study’s findings.  In her study of how accountability and performance award 
systems impact various aspects of schooling, Ladd (1999) analyzed the impacts of the 
Dallas Independent School District’s school-based accountability and performance 
incentive program. In this program which started in 1991, schools were measured on their 
ability to raise student performance on standardized tests. Those schools that were most 
effective – approximately the top 20 percent in the district – received financial bonuses, 
which were distributed to everyone on the school staff, including principals (Ladd, 1999). 
In addition to seeing positive impacts on student performance that were at least in part 
attributable to the program, Ladd (1999) found a dramatic increase in principal turnover 
over the course of the performance incentive program’s implementation. Ladd showed 
that prior to the program, principal turnover rates in least effective schools, average 
effective schools, and most effective schools were 2.4 percent, 6.7 percent, and 6.3 
percent, respectively. By the end of the program these rates had increased to 24.6 percent, 
25.0 percent, and 24.4 percent, respectively. Ladd (1999) asserted, “Thus, it appears that 
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the new emphasis on accountability made the District much more willing than in the past 
to change principals” (p. 14). She concluded that this compositional effect on the 
principal workforce may have been due to the program and that this change, which was 
most dramatic in the lowest performing schools, could have positive impacts on student 
performance.   
In the current study, I also conducted an exploratory analysis of the differences in 
principal retention patterns among various performance levels. I found that across school 
levels, principals who leave the profession tend to have roughly the same characteristics 
as those who stay in the profession. Further, there is virtually no difference between the 
performance of those who leave and those who remain in the profession.  I did, however, 
find that there is a difference in the turnover rates of principals – defined as one minus 
the ratio of principals who remain in the same position in the same school year over year 
– based on performance. In this analysis of principal turnover by performance level, I 
grouped principals as high- (principals in the top third in percent proficient), medium- 
(principals in the middle third in percent proficient), and low-performing (principals in 
the bottom third in percent proficient).  My findings of differential turnover rates by level 
of performance might have several explanations. It could be that, as Ladd (1999) 
suggested, low-performing schools have, at times, been more likely to change their 
principals. Alternatively, new principals might get their first jobs at low-performing 
schools, and after getting a few years of experience, they might be eager to move to less-
challenging principalships elsewhere. Further investigation of these, and other, 
hypotheses should be conducted in future studies.    
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Study Limitations 
The greatest limitation for this study is that the measures of principal performance 
are relatively basic. Although there is a reasonable justification for using principal 
performance measures that are publicly reported, as I have done, the performance 
variables in this study only take into account the performance of a principal in the prior 
year.  It is true that both performance measures – AYP and percent proficient – do not 
take into account the fact that principals may be serving different types of student 
populations.   
High performing schools, and principals, could be seen to be those that contribute 
to disproportionate growth in student performance, after controlling for the prior 
performance of the student body and student demographics. By predicting a school’s 
performance and then determining whether a school beats that prediction, I could have a 
different measure of principal effectiveness. My analysis could then explore whether 
principals, who are viewed as effective by looking at absolute performance measures, are 
in fact the same ones who are effective in promoting student achievement growth.  I 
could then compare pay differentials based relative to this new performance measure. 
Finally, the lack of availability of data on principals’ prior and subsequent career 
choices and salaries also limits the strength of inferences that can be drawn. Additionally, 
some cases were lost due to missing salaries or other control variables. In total, attrition 
was approximately 20 percent. To the extent that the analysis sample did not accurately 
represent the population, my findings will be skewed.   
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Chapter 7: Recommendations 
Recommendations for Policymakers 
This study was designed to be a guide Arkansas state policymakers who might 
consider improvements in educational leadership at the school level as strategy to address 
the public policy problem of low student achievement. To date, little research has been 
conducted on the principal labor market to determine what drives differences in principal 
pay and to examine how introducing pay incentives into the principal labor market might 
impact current principal behaviors, regarding their prioritizing of job responsibilities or 
concerning their decisions about where to work. Before considering modifications to 
principal compensation structures, policymakers in Arkansas – both at the state and local 
level – need to know what incentives exist already and how principals have tended to 
respond to those incentives.  
The theoretical framework for the study was principal-agent theory. As noted 
above, the complexity of having multiple principals and agents with their own priorities 
can lead to severe goal misalignment in public sector work, including the education 
policy context (Burgess and Ratto, 2003; Propper and Wilson, 2003; Goldhaber, 2007). 
To align goals and minimize agency costs, education policy principals may wish to adopt 
performance-based compensation policies that tie compensation to increases in student 
achievement. For this recommendation to be valid, it will be necessary for policy 
principals to reach consensus on measuring principal performance through student test 
scores. Even in the climate of testing and accountability that has been established by No 
Child Left Behind, the diverse stakeholders in public education will not easily arrive at 
agreement that student test scores are a practical and appropriate way to monitor principal 
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performance. At its very core, public education is perceived as being designed to serve a 
variety of purposes, not simply educating students in academic fundamentals. 
Policymakers who are interested in experimenting with incentive-based principal quality 
reforms will likely need to compromise and may wish to allow for the use of a variety of 
performance indicators in principal rating schemes. For example, rating strategies such as  
peer reviews may provide evidence of principal effectiveness in meeting other perceived 
goals of public education. Nonetheless, setting incentives tied to transparent, publicly 
available performance measures can resolve monitoring difficulties inherent in principal-
agent relationships and can improve goal congruence by signaling clearly about policy 
priorities (Ferris, 1992). Moreover, research shows that when designed properly and 
implemented successfully (Lavy, 2007; Figlio and Kenney, 2006; Podgursky and 
Springer; 2007), performance pay policies in education have the potential to raise student 
achievement. However, policy principals (school boards) considering these pay reforms 
should be aware of barriers to successful policy implementation. 
 One significant obstacle to successful implementation of performance-based pay 
reforms is teacher, or agent, buy-in. Even if policy principals, such as school boards, are 
able to agree upon using student achievement as measured on standardized tests as a way 
to monitor performance, ultimately teachers and principals have to adopt the goal of 
raising student achievement as their own priority (McDermott, 2004).  Teachers must 
also agree that measuring student achievement by standardized test scores is meaningful. 
That is, in choosing incentives to motivate policy actors, policymakers also must keep in 
mind how policy agents will respond to these incentives. One possibility is that educators 
will see themselves as having to abandon their commitments to serving the needs of 
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young people because the incentives created by policy principals do not align with 
teachers’ concepts of their duties to attend to student needs (McDermott, 2004; Lipsky, 
1980).  As Lipsky (1980) suggested in his scholarship on street-level bureaucrats, 
educators may object to measurement of performance by student test scores and view 
these policy prescriptions and their superiors who support such prescriptions as 
illegitimate. When this occurs, policies are undermined and not implemented as designed.  
 One way that policymakers can seek to get teacher and school principal buy-in to 
support performance-based pay is to involve teachers and school principals in the design 
of their merit pay plans (Heneman, Milanowski, and Kimball, 2007). Indeed, one 
characteristic of well-conceived policy is that, though the original policy intents may be 
addressed at a hierarchically super-ordinate level, the ultimate implementation decisions 
are left to policy actors at the street level, who can develop an appropriate 
implementation strategy that would best fit their local circumstances (DeLeon and 
DeLeon, 2002). That is, even though state policymakers can mandate that localities 
implement performance-based pay that involves measuring educator success by gains in 
student achievement on standardized tests, policy principals may wish to include policy 
agents in designing performance-based pay programs the local level.  
This study has one primary recommendation and two positive potential outcomes 
related to the recommendation. First, the original research in this study indicates that 
principals are not meaningfully rewarded for superior performance, either through 
explicit performance bonuses or though earning higher salaries by being hired in better 
paying principalships. Variation in principal pay is driven by the size of the district and 
school in which a principal works, the amount of wealth in a district, a principal’s 
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experience, and a principal’s degree level. If policymakers would like to focus principal 
attention on performance, rather than encouraging them simply to earn higher degrees or 
to seek employment in districts with certain characteristics, policymakers should consider 
instituting performance-based pay.   
Second, evidence from research on the principal labor market in Texas indicates 
that introducing performance rewards increases scrutiny of performance and can drive 
changes in the composition of the principal workforce (Ladd, 1999). Perhaps as in Texas 
the institution of performance awards in Arkansas by policymakers can improve their 
monitoring abilities and might lead to a greater willingness on the part of school leaders 
to make personnel changes when principals are shown to be low performing. As with 
setting performance indicators, there will likely be political obstacles to introducing these 
performance incentives both at the state and local levels. In particular, these new policies 
may be difficult to implement because of the inherent controversy involved when 
employment changes occur. 
Recommendations for Researchers 
 
As noted repeatedly above, very little research has been conducted on the features 
of the school principal labor market. At the conclusion of his recent study on principal 
compensation, teacher and principal compensation expert Dan Goldhaber (2007) noted: 
… outside of a few high-profile examples, we have virtually no systemic 
knowledge about the structure of principal compensation including the 
extent to which compensation is linked to specific principal credentials or 
characteristics, or covered by collective bargaining agreements; whether 
principals are financially rewarded for taking tough leadership 
assignments; and whether there is a link between their compensation and 
measures of their performance. It should come as no surprise that a 
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researcher is recommending more research on a topic, but, in this case, 
the need is profound. (p. 15) 
 
In addition to echoing Goldhaber’s (2007) call for more research on this topic, I would 
refine his suggestion by calling for state-by-state research on principal labor markets, 
principal performance pay, and principal compensation systems. Simply by contrasting 
the findings from research on the Texas principal labor market to the Arkansas principal 
labor market, the current study demonstrates that there are policy differences across 
states. After researchers uncover these differences across states, they should begin to 
explore whether these policy differences could be related to variation in student 
performance.   
 Second, I would recommend that the exploration of the principal labor market in 
Arkansas be extended to explore the role of deferred compensation, such as principal 
pension plans, in its relation to principal turnover rates and patterns. Recently, Costrell 
and McGee (2009) have shown that teacher retirement behavior in Arkansas is impacted 
by the incentives that are created by the features of the teacher retirement system. 
Retirement behaviors of principals in Arkansas should be explored with respect to 
pension incentives particularly with reference to principal performance. Specifically, are 
low performing principals being induced to stay on the job because of the structure of 
their deferred compensation?  
 In conclusion, the original research in this study indicates that principals in 
Arkansas are not meaningfully rewarded for superior performance, either through explicit 
performance bonuses or though earning higher salaries by being hired in better paying 
principalships. Variation in principal pay is driven by the district and school enrollment, 
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the amount of wealth in a district, a principal’s experience, and a principal’s degree level. 
If policymakers would like to focus principal attention on performance, rather than 
encouraging them simply to earn higher degrees or to seek employment in large, wealthy 
districts, policymakers should consider instituting performance-based pay. 
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Appendices  
 
Appendix A: Examples of Admission and Graduation Requirements for Principals 
 
Basic Facts about Three Approved Administrator Licensure Preparation Programs (See 
Appendix B for detailed course requirements by program) 
University Degree Admission Requirements 
Graduation 
Requirements 
Arkansas State 
Master of Science 
in Education 
(MSE) 
1. Hold a valid teaching license 
2. Minimum undergrad GPA of 
3.00 (on a 4.00 scale) 
3. Have two years of teaching 
experience 
4. Have a written commitment 
from a practicing building-level 
administrator who will function 
as your mentor during the 
degree program/program of 
study* 
1. Completion of 36 
hours in required 
course of study. 
Courses in Ethical 
Leadership, School 
Law, Supervision 
and Evaluation of 
Teaching, etc. 
2. Completion of 
Supervised 
Internship in last 
semester 
3. Completion of 
program portfolio 
U of A Fayetteville 
Master of 
Education in 
Educational 
Leadership (MEd) 
1. Completion of a bachelor’s 
degree from an accredited 
institution 
2. Prior admission to the 
University of Arkansas Graduate 
School, involving a separate 
application process 
3. Submission of proof of a 
currently valid teaching 
certificate 
4. A completed Educational 
Leadership Program Application 
for Admission Form 
5. At least three supporting 
letters of recommendation 
6. An undergraduate cumulative 
grade point average of 3.00 or 
higher on a 4-point scale* 
1. Completion of 33 
hours in required 
course of study.  
Courses in School 
Law, Analytical 
Decision Making, 
School Building 
Finance, etc. 
2. A cumulative 
grade-point average 
of at least 3.00 on all 
course work is 
required for the 
degree. No grades 
below “C” are 
accepted for graduate 
degree credit 
3. Satisfactory 
performance on a 
written 
comprehensive 
examination or 
portfolio presentation 
4. Completion of 
Internship 
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U of A Little Rock 
Master of 
Education (MEd) 
in Educational 
Administration and 
Supervision 
1. A baccalaureate degree 
from a regionally accredited 
institution 
2. A cumulative grade point 
average of at least 2.75 (4.0 
scale) or 3.0 in the last 60 
hours 
3. A valid teacher license 
4. An autobiographical data 
form 
5. Two letters of reference 
6. A recommendation of the 
program advisor 
7. Evidence of two years 
teaching experience at a 
level appropriate to the 
individual’s program 
emphasis. * 
 
1. Completion 
of 37 hours in 
required course 
of study. 
Courses in 
Education Law 
and Ethics, 
Supervision of 
Learning 
Services, School 
Finance, etc. 
2. Master’s 
Degree Portfolio 
presentation to 
program faculty 
and an outside 
administrator/ 
practitioner. 
3. Two 
Semesters of 
Administrative 
Internship 
*conditional admission requirements exist for those not meeting these criteria) 
http://education.astate.edu/ease/masters_edlead.htm; http://ualr.edu/edleadership/; 
http://edle.uark.edu/4335.htm 
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Appendix B: Coursework required for administrator licensure by program 
 
Arkansas State University 
 
Master of Education Leadership (M.Ed.) Degree Course Requirements 
http://education.astate.edu/ease/masters_edlead.htm 
 
A. Foundation Courses 
o ELFN 6773 Introduction to Statistics and Research  
o ELFN 6763 Philosophies of Education  
(These two foundation courses should be taken early in the program.) 
B. Introductory/Prerequisite Course 
o ELAD 6103 Ethical Leadership 
(Action Research and the Portfolio are initiated in this course which also 
serves as the prerequisite to all other ELCI/ELAD courses; this course can 
be, however, taken concurrently with another ELCI or ELAD course.) 
C. Educational Administration and Curriculum/Instruction Core Courses 
o ELAD 6073 School Law 
o ELAD 6003 School and Community Relations 
o ELAD 6033 Administration and Supervision of Special Education 
o ELAD 6053 Planning and Resource Allocation 
o ELCI 6533 Theories of Instruction 
o ELCI 6083 Supervision and Evaluation of Teaching  
o ELCI 6063 Curriculum Management 
 
[One of the following curriculum courses; (ELCI 6063 is a prerequisite)] 
o ELCI 6323 Elementary School Curriculum  
o ELCI 6423 Middle School Curriculum 
o ELCI 6523 Secondary School Curriculum 
D. Internship 
ELAD 6593 Supervised Internship 
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University of Arkansas – Fayetteville  
Master of Education (M.Ed.) Degree Course Requirements http://edle.uark.edu/1000.htm 
A. Completion of the following required common courses in Educational Leadership 
twenty-four (24) hours):  
o EDLE 5013 School Organization and Administration  
o EDLE 5023 The School Principalship  
o EDLE 5043 Ethical Leadership  
o EDLE 5053 School Law  
o EDLE 5063 Instructional Leadership, Planning and Supervision  
o EDLE 5083 Analytical Decision Making  
o EDLE 5093 Effective Leadership for School Improvement  
o EDLE 574V Internship (3 hours)  
 
B. Completion of nine (9) credit hours from a common core of designated three-hour 
courses required by the University of Arkansas College of Education and Health 
Professions, including:  
o EDLE 5033 Psychology of Learning  
o EDLE 5073 Research for School Leaders  
o EDFD 5013 Research Methods in Education or EDFD 5393 Applied 
Educational Statistics  
o EDFD 5303 Historical Foundations of Modern Education 
University of Arkansas – Little Rock  
 
Master of Education (M.Ed.) Educational Administration Degree Course Requirements 
http://ualr.edu/med/EDAS/ 
 
A. Educational Foundations (6 hours)  
o EDFN 7303 
o  Introduction to Educational Research EDFN 7370  
 
B. Educational Assessment Building Level Internship (6 hours)  
o EDAS 7380 Administrative Internship (First Semester)  
o EDAS 7380 Administrative Internship (Second Semester) 
 
C. Required Coursework Educational Administration (23 hours)  
o EDAS 7209 Building Coalitions in School and Community  
o EDAS 7300 Foundations of Educational Administration  
o EDAS 7301 Administration and Assessment of Curricular Programs 
o EDAS 7302 School Finance and Human Resource Allocation  
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o EDAS 7303 Education Law and Ethics  
o EDAS 7304 Supervision of Learning Services  
o EDAS 7305 The Principalship  
o EDAS 7310 Facilitating School Improvement Counselor Education (2 
hours)  
o CNSL 7212 Effective Communication in the Educational Organization  
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Appendix C: Complete Question 1 Tables for Subgroup Analyses 
 
Appendix Table C.1: Complete Research Question One Regression Table for  
Elementary School Principals  
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $84,358; SD $12,305) 
for Model 3 (M $84,416; SD $12,314) 
Variable 
 Model 1                
(No 
Performance 
Data)  
Model 2 
(AYP Data) 
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
Experience (years) 
 141.49**         
(28.64)  
142.87**     
(28.62) 
139.20**      
(28.74) 
Female 
101.09        
(522.02)  
61.31      
(521.95) 
1.43      
(525.07) 
Principal Minority (non 
white) 
-1810.47*     
(733.99) 
-1767.32*        
(733.64) 
-1669.04*       
(742.91) 
BA 
 -5900.41**     
(2249.77)  
-5927.46**     
(2247.66) 
-5971.00**       
(2249.50) 
MA (Omitted) ----- ----- ----- 
Specialist 
 2564.80**      
(637.96)  
2565.55**      
(637.35) 
2557.18**       
(638.27) 
Doctorate 
 6582.45**      
(1322.98)  
6662.97**       
(1322.41) 
6895.68**       
(1338.32) 
District Enrollment 
 .741**                  
(.06)  
.74**         
(.06) 
.74**          
(.06) 
District _FRL% 
 -77.95*            
(28.03)  
-78.11*      
(32.29) 
-87.57**        
(32.61) 
District_Minority% 
 40.58            
(30.21)  
41.40     
(30.19) 
46.22         
(30.45) 
District_Wealth 
62.11**        
(14.60)   
60.32**   
(14.62) 
58.35**    
(14.68) 
School Enrollment 
 13.34**               
(1.47)  
13.52**      
(1.47) 
13.01**      
(.76) 
School_FRL% 
 -25.60                 
(26.20)  
-22.84          
(26.21) 
-9.12       
(27.09) 
School_Minority% 
 1.75            
(27.12)  
6.16       
(27.20) 
7.87         
(27.53) 
Year 2005-06 ----- ----- ----- 
Year 2006-07 
 3249.95**       
(568.50)  
3230.90**     
(429.39) 
2930.41**       
(590.06) 
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Year 2007-08 
 5823.03**         
(577.52)  
5812.64**        
(577.00) 
5236.24**         
(629.64) 
Meets_AYP  -----  
1253.88      
(666.85) ----- 
Average % proficient time t-1  -----  ----- 
45.37*      
(19.49) 
Intercept 
 68,774.88**         
(1,917.19)  
67,459**    
(2,039.11) 
65, 984**       
(2,291.14) 
N observations 1341 1341 1341 
R2 0.522 0.523 0.523 
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Appendix Table C.2: Complete Research Question One Regression Table for 
Middle School Principals    
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $89,471; SD $12,678) 
for Model 3 (M $89,510; SD $12,701) 
Variable 
 Model 1                
(No 
Performance 
Data)  
Model 2 
(AYP Data) 
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
Experience (years) 
 63.63         
(44.25)  
59.22     
(44.35) 
57.45**      
(0.19) 
Female 
-1175.89           
(757.08)  
-1098.13     
(758.96) 
-1391.62      
(751.63) 
Principal Minority (non white) 
-176.83     
(1424.54) 
-163.93        
(1423.61) 
1009.78       
(1444.80) 
BA 
-4330.97       
(2981.34)  
-4169.37      
(2981.96) 
-3619.42**       
(2954.22) 
MA (Omitted) ----- ----- ----- 
Specialist 
 3655.95**      
(865.37)  
3666.28**      
(864.82) 
3995.10**       
(864.41) 
Doctorate 
 4575.63*      
(1498.37)  
4801.46**       
(1507.53) 
4664.68**       
(1478.88) 
District Enrollment 
 .82**                 
(.10)  
.83**         
(.10) 
.82**          
(.10) 
District _FRL% 
-146.42            
(84.81)  
-150.03      
(84.80) 
-152.38**        
(32.61) 
District_Minority% 
89.26            
(82.68)  
88.09     
(82.63) 
88.62         
(81.82) 
District_Wealth 
11.42        
(21.23)   
10.33   
(21.23) 
.63       
(21.27) 
School Enrollment 
18.12**               
(2.10)  
18.42**      
(2.11) 
17.18**      
(2.11) 
School_FRL% 
75.35                
(77.59)  
-82.77         
(77.75) 
92.02       
(76.65) 
School_Minority% 
-25.03            
(80.41)  
-18.93      
(80.50) 
7.12         
(80.60) 
Year 2005-06 ----- ----- ----- 
Year 2006-07 
 3552.13**       
(882.06)  
3577.12**     
(881.68) 
3202.10**       
(895.36) 
Year 2007-08 
 6903.50**         
(884.76)  
7011.42**        
(888.10) 
5677.85**         
(975.76) 
Meets_AYP  -----  
1126.03      
(871.48) ----- 
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Average % proficient time t-1  -----  ----- 
109.71**      
(40.23) 
Intercept 
 68,774.88**         
(1,917.19)  
70,199.17**    
(3,177.31) 
65, 
731.23**       
(3,724.04) 
N observations 512 512 508 
R2 0.607 0.609 0.620 
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Appendix Table C.3: Complete Research Question One Regression Table for High 
School Principals   
Dependent Variable: Level of Principal Salary (M $86,588; SD $14,349) 
for Model 3 (M $86,470; SD $14,253) 
Variable 
 Model 1                
(No 
Performance 
Data)  
Model 2 
(AYP Data) 
Model 3 
(Percent 
Proficient) 
Experience (years) 
267.80**     
(43.67) 
267.81    
(43.70) 
267.05**      
(44.36) 
Female 
-1302.83          
(1001.80)  
-1305.78     
(1003.90) 
-1188.02      
(1039.89) 
Principal Minority (non white) 
1959.29     
(1597.54) 
1966.72        
(1607.32) 
1704.91       
(1680.49) 
BA 
-4346.58       
(2809.25)  
-4337.18      
(2819.13) 
-4473.58       
(2834.48) 
MA (Omitted) ----- ----- ----- 
Specialist 
 1614.55      
(1061.66)  
1614.25     
(1062.43) 
1560.28       
(1094.73) 
Doctorate 
4402.57      
(2368.17)  
4406.19       
(2371.24) 
3520.93      
(2528.21) 
District Enrollment 
 .75**                 
(.13)  
.75**         
(.13) 
.76**          
(.13) 
District _FRL% 
-25.79            
(79.22)  
-25.49      
(79.54) 
-32.35       
(82.46) 
District_Minority% 
-42.46            
(91.61)  
-42.73     
(91.87) 
-39.67        
(96.36) 
District_Wealth 
-26.45       
(21.48)   
-26.47**      
(21.50) 
-25.27      
(21.78) 
School Enrollment 
14.86**               
(1.68)  
14.86**             
(1.38) 
14.61**      
(1.40) 
School_FRL% 
-21.22                
(66.16)  
-21.38        
(66.31) 
-54.61       
(69.35) 
School_Minority% 
86.91            
(87.35)  
87.58     
(88.67) 
86.91         
(92.74) 
Year 2005-06 ----- ----- ----- 
Year 2006-07 
 3569.52**       
(902.98)  
3572.18**     
(905.59) 
3584.80**       
(928.88) 
Year 2007-08 
 6770.87**         
(898.65)  
677.04**        
(900.60) 
6670.35**         
(932.69) 
Meets_AYP  -----  
50.97      
(1142.54) ----- 
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Average % proficient time t-1  -----  ----- 
8.48      
(34.34) 
Intercept 
 
70,653.55**         
(2,543.02)  
70,592.68**    
(2,887.65) 
69,819.54**       
(3,266) 
N observations 717 717 697 
R2 0.537 0.537 0.526 
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